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Chapter 1: Introduction1  
The primary obstacle to clandestine and unlawful nuclear weapon production 
is to get access to sufficient quantities and qualities of fissile material. 
Highly enriched uranium or plutonium is the essential components of any 
nuclear explosive device. It is considerably easier to make a bomb using 
enriched uranium than using plutonium.2 Potential proliferators could there-
fore try to divert uranium material directly from any weapons-usable source, 
e.g. from the naval fuel cycle, due to the extremely high enrichment levels 
and low radiation levels.3 Highly enriched naval fuel cycles may thus serve 
as a back door for production of clandestine nuclear weapons. 
To increase confidence in non-diversion of naval fuel and to support con-
temporary nuclear arms control efforts, this report suggests a set of transpar-
ency measures that could be introduced on stockpiles of naval fissile 
material. Particular attention will be given to U.S. and Russian naval fuel 
stocks, as these are by far the most extensive in the world. The U.S. and 
Russia are nuclear weapon states and their fissile material is therefore not 
subjected to safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.4  
As international nuclear arms control stands poised to move beyond 
agreements limiting strategic delivery systems, and the international com-
munity tries to shrink the noose around all stockpiles of weapons-grade 
fissile material, they will, sooner or later encounter the stocks of highly 
enriched uranium destined for naval nuclear prolusion purposes.5 Moreover, 
as Russia is currently evolving plans for the construction and possible export 
of floating nuclear power plants, using reactors fuel with HEU, new markets 
for HEU outside international control could, emerge. If this fuel has been 
enriched to 90 % or higher, as low as 10 fuel assemblies could supply 
enough highly enriched uranium for a bomb.6 Yet, the level of international 
control and transparency on these large and highly proliferation-attractive 
stockpiles is strikingly low. 
                                                     
1  This report was produced as part of the NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship, and was 
largely written during my stay as a Science Program Fellow at the Center for International 
Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, the 1999/2000 academic year. In 
addition to the NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship, the beneficial stay at CISAC was 
made possible through the gracious funding of the Fulbright Foundation, the 
Scandinavian–American Association, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, and CISAC. 
The views expressed here, however, are the author’s, and not necessary those of the 
mentioned institutions. The report is slightly revised January 2002, and published by the 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
2  Bodansky (1996) p. 271. 
3  In fact, the inherent properties of HEU make the material more proliferation-attractive 
than plutonium. Cf. Appendix II. 
4  By the end of 1997, the total stocks of military plutonium and weapons-grade uranium in 
the U.S. and Russia were estimated to be 250 tons and 1700 tons respectively. (Albright 
& O’Neill, 1999, p. 11.)  
5  von Hippel (1997). 
6  Ibid. The authors assume that about 12 kg of weapons-grade uranium would be needed to 
produce an implosion-type nuclear device, i.e. half the quantity with which this report 
operates. Moreover, Bukharin and Potter apparently assume that as much as 300 kg of U-
235 is available in the reactor cores. This latter assumption contrasts the quantities given 
in the Sevmorput Safety report, indicating only 150 kg of HEU.  
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The report identifies ways to increase transparency in the naval fuel cycle 
without conflicting with national security needs or concerns, and argues that 
such transparency measures will give long-term nuclear security benefits. 
The report is divided into five chapters and two appendixes. Following this 
introductory chapter, the next chapter provides a general background on 
fissile material transparency, including definitions, recent political transpar-
ency commitments, and a discussion of obstacles to transparency, both of a 
justified and of unjustified character. Chapter 3 deals with the current 
transparency situation – or more correctly, the lack of such measures – 
regarding naval fuel cycles, both in nuclear weapon states and in non-nuclear 
weapon states. Chapter 4 suggests a set of transparency components that 
could be acceptable to the possessors of nuclear submarines, as a foundation 
for a voluntary naval fuel transparency regime.  
Conclusions and recommendations for the implementation of the 
proposed transparency components are given in Chapter 5. Appendix I 
provides an analysis of current and future naval fuel consumption levels in 
the U.S. and Russia, and technical background information on the fuel. The 
analysis shows that existing naval fuel stockpiles in the two states are 
substantial and that their fuel needs in the future are diminishing. This could 
ease the political process of introducing transparency on the highly sensitive 
naval fuel cycles. In appendix II, the proliferation potential of naval fuel is 
discussed, including an assessment of the challenges associated with using 
naval HEU fuel as the fissionable explosives of crude nuclear devices. This 
assessment is presented to underline the need for increased international 
focus on all HEU naval fuel cycles, with a future international naval fuel 
transparency norm as the ultimate goal.  
Throughout the text, the term “transparency” is used to cover voluntary 
measures initiated by the individual state(s) to increase international confi-
dence in non-diversion of naval fuel for nuclear explosive purposes.  
 
 
Chapter 2:  
Why fissile material transparency? 
While existing arms control agreements do not include any restrictions on 
the stockpiles of fissile material, the stocks of fissile material place a de 
facto upper limit on the number of warheads that can be produced. Today 
there is no requirement to eliminate any nuclear warheads: current agree-
ments only require elimination of delivery systems and put limits on the 
number of warheads each can carry. The existence of large stockpiles of 
fissile material will create a potential for rapid and large-scale “breakouts” 
from treaty obligations. Thus, if military nuclear arms reductions are to be 
made permanent, more information will have to be made available about all 
military stocks of fissile material, and steps must be taken to reduce these 
stocks so that they cannot be easily re-introduced into nuclear weapon 
assemblies or used in crude nuclear explosive devises. 
Fissile material transparency is therefore likely to become an increasingly 
important tool for addressing both arms control and nonproliferation issues 
in the coming decades.7 Accurate information on the stocks of fissile mater-
ial is prerequisite for gaining control of and confidence in non-diversion of 
the material. The considerable uncertainties in fissile material inventories 
could in fact prove to be the largest obstacle for verifying nuclear disarma-
ment.8 International transparency of fuel stocks, while protecting prolifera-
tion sensitive information, is therefore likely to support both global nonproli-
feration efforts and the long-term security interests of Russia and the United 
States.9 
Until recently, it was assumed that information on plutonium and HEU 
stocks should be available only to governments, industrial companies and 
international agencies. In most countries that possess nuclear weapons or 
that are trying to acquire them, information about HEU and plutonium pro-
duction is still classified. The latter part of the past decade has seen a politi-
cal shift and there is now widespread agreement that greater transparency is 
a desirable goal.10  
                                                     
7  For useful sets of policy recommendations for nuclear material transparency, see e.g. Task 
Force VI panel of CSIS (2000), pp. 58–64, Bukharin & Luongo (1999), pp. 11–15, Bunn 
(2000), National Academy of Sciences (1994), and Fetter (1999). 
8  In his paper “Verifying Nuclear Disarmament” (1996) Fetter outlines the technological 
possibilities for verifying compliance with a nuclear disarmament treaty. While not expli-
citly stating the close interrelated relations between nuclear disarmament and nuclear pro-
liferation, he stresses the importance of the nuclear weapon states providing detailed 
declarations of their stockpiles and allowing these declarations to be verified. Only such 
actions will lay the necessary foundation for nuclear disarmament, because today’s uncer-
tainties regarding existing quantities of nuclear material will be magnified as the world 
struggles towards minimizing the number of warheads.  
9  Transparent and irreversible nuclear reductions are part of the long term U.S. nonprolife-
ration program for Russia. See e.g. the statement of Gottemoeller (2000).  
10  Albright et al. (1997), pp. 6–7.  
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This is reflected both in bilateral transparency commitments and the 
voluntary stockpile declarations put forward by some of the nuclear weapon 
states, notably the U.S. and the U.K. 
More information is now available about military nuclear programs than 
only a few years ago, but still there exist no official figures on the military 
inventories of HEU in the nuclear weapon states.11 U.S. estimates of the size 
of the Russian fissile material stockpile have an uncertainty factor of more 
than a hundred tons.12 Moreover, hardly any of the measures necessary to 
verifiably reduce stockpile of nuclear warheads and fissile material to low, 
agreed levels are in place. These are measures that will have to be developed 
by the states with the largest stockpiles: the United States and Russia.13 
Once introduced and in place, transparency measures could have a self-
intensifying effect. Voluntary measures will generate increased confidence 
in the peaceful (non-offensive) nuclear intentions of the adversary, reducing 
tensions and the perceived need for secrecy. It is to be hoped that they will 
create a climate of new declaration and openness, producing a positive 
response to the disarmament and nonproliferation processes. The goal of 
confidence building is to release information through transparency activities 
that can corroborate that no clandestine activities are taking place, bolster the 
validity of material accounting, confirm that nuclear material is adequately 
protected, and verify that nonproliferation obligations are being met. 
Thus there exist several interrelated incentives for increased transparency 
on all stocks of fissile materials, including materials destined for naval 
nuclear propulsion:  
 
– to gain confidence in non-diversion, 
– to maintain constructive security dialogues,  
– to raise awareness of international nonproliferation challenges, and  
– to identify the best and most sustainable nuclear security options. 
The meaning of transparency 
“Transparency” could be understood as measures that provide confidence 
that a activity is taking place. “Verification”, however, could be understood 
as measures that confirm that a activity is actually taking place. For arms 
control, transparency involves for instance measures that build the confi-
dence of each side in its understanding of the size of the other’s stockpiles of 
nuclear weapons and fissile material, and the rate of reduction of these stock-
piles.14 Implementing international verification and transparency measures 
will not necessarily be the same as applying IAEA safeguards, though some 
of the measures (e.g. declarations) and techniques employed may have com-
mon features.15 
                                                     
11  The United Kingdom is a noteworthy exception. As mentioned, the U.S. is currently pro-
ducing a report on its HEU production, along the lines of the national plutonium assess-
ment.  
12  Bunn (2000), p.17.  
13  Ibid, p. 2.  
14  DOE (1997), p. 6 & p. 21.  
15  The safeguards of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are meant to verify compliance with treaty 
by providing for “the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear 
material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of 
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Nuclear weapons states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty have an obli-
gation not to disseminate sensitive nuclear information to non-nuclear wea-
pon states.16 However, the internationally most credible way of preventing 
clandestine and unlawful use of plutonium or uranium is to place surplus 
stocks under international or bilateral surveillance. Thus, the major incentive 
for promoting transparency on existing stocks of fissile material is not pri-
marily to supply security to the material itself (which may be adequate in 
most nuclear weapon states), but to reassure the international community 
that the material will not be diverted to other uses. 
Transparency itself will necessarily be a dynamic process, dependent on 
the audience, the timing requirements of the activities, the location of the 
effort (country or facility where activity takes place) and changes in the 
international environment.17 Also culture will have an impact on transpar-
ency, as cultural characteristics and beliefs will affect how it is interpreted. 
Bearing in mind the different dynamics of interrelationships, one could 
define transparency as a: “.... cooperative process that is based on thorough 
risk-benefit assessments and that (1) increases openness and builds confi-
dence, (2) promotes mutual trust and working relationships among countries, 
national and international agencies, and the public, and (3) facilitates verify-
cation and monitoring measures by information exchanges.”18 
Thus, transparency is more than a description of a nuclear program or a 
specific site. Based on voluntary measures, it permits the accumulation of 
data, both direct and indirect, over an extensive period of time to build confi-
dence that behavior of a country or a group of countries is consistent with 
agreements and norms. Transparency surpasses such required activities as 
reporting to regulatory bodies. Transparency has been aptly described as 
“permitted knowledge”.19 The voluntary release of information is the true 
measure of transparency. Moreover, taking extra steps of openness beyond 
expectations will promote even higher levels of trust. 
Political transparency commitments  
With the end of the Cold War have come substantial changes in how nuclear 
powers view their stockpiles of weapons and their stocks of fissile material. 
There appears to be a growing willingness on the part of most of the 
                                                     
other nuclear explosive devices or for the purposes unknown, and the deterrence of such 
diversion by the risk of early detection”. From IAEA INFCIRC/153, article 28. The pro-
duction of HEU and plutonium for use in weapons and other national defense purposes 
requires many of the same steps as those involved in the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, and 
many of the same government facilities constructed for military programs have been used 
to produce fuel for civilian nuclear-power reactors. The relationship between the civilian 
and military fuel cycles has prompted international concerns that nuclear material in the 
civilian sector could be used for manufacturing nuclear weapons. To counter the threat of 
nuclear weapons proliferation, 185 countries have agreed to implement the nuclear-
material safeguards developed and monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). IAEA’s safeguards involve accounting and verification procedures designed to 
detect unauthorized diversions of nuclear material that could occur in the commercial fuel 
cycle. To further expand nuclear safeguards, the United States has voluntarily agreed to 
allow the IAEA to inspect certain inventories of U.S. HEU and plutonium no longer 
needed for national defense purposes. From DOE/EIA (1998), p. 8. 
16  The Non-Proliferation Treaty, article III.  
17  Mochiji et al. (1999), p. 47. 
18  CSIS (2000), p. 53. 
19  Ibid, p. 54.  
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established nuclear powers to reduce the sizes of their stockpiles and to use 
the excess material for peaceful energy production, or to provide for their 
ultimate disposal under stringent safeguards.20 
As a part of this process, the United States and Russia have launched 
several bilateral nuclear warhead and material transparency efforts. The first 
of these was launched at the January 1994 summit when the presidents of 
both countries agreed on a goal of “ensuring the transparency and irreversi-
bility of the process of reduction of nuclear weapons.” The initiative, dubbed 
the “Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility (STI)” initiative, was 
designed largely to ensure that fissile material from eliminated warheads 
would not be recycled into new weapons.21  
Despite the good intentions and practical work (such as working groups 
for spot checks to increase confidence in fissile material declarations, and 
mutual reciprocal inspections) the STI initiative collapsed when the two 
countries could not commit themselves to an agreement that would allow the 
cooperative exchange of sensitive and classified information.22 All the same, 
interest in political transparency remained alive, and the issue was resurrec-
ted at the March 1997 Presidential Summit in Helsinki when Presidents 
Yeltsin and Clinton agreed that the proposed START III agreement would 
include transparency measures.23  
Moreover, as part of the U.S. Openness Initiative, the Department of 
Energy released a report on plutonium production, acquisition, and utiliza-
tion in the U.S. from 1944 through 1994.24 The United States is expected to 
release similar information on its HEU stockpile and use in the near future. 
The extensive production of uranium and the complexity of the uranium fuel 
cycle render such assessment more challenging than the plutonium 
account.25 The intentions behind the 1996 plutonium report were to aid in 
discussions of plutonium storage, safety and security with stakeholders, as 
well as to encourage other nations to declassify and release similar data.26  
                                                     
20  Unfortunately, many good political intentions have stranded before their practical imple-
mentation. For an overview of transparency commitments that never were implemented, 
see Bunn (2000), p. 88.  
21  Bukharin & Luongo (1999), p.3. 
22  In the area of mutual reciprocal inspections (MRI), the proposed activity was to have U.S. 
and Russian technical experts develop non-intrusive techniques of confirming that, at the 
end of the dismantlement process, a declared fissile material container contains a wea-
pons-grade plutonium or highly-enriched uranium (HEU) object the shape and mass of 
which (in the case of a warhead pit) are consistent with those of a warhead component. 
During 1994 and 1995, Russian and U.S. experts developed and demonstrated some pro-
mising MRI techniques, but no consensus was reached on the scope of fissile material 
measurements or specific MRI procedures. Bukharin & Luongo (1999), p.3. 
23  Relating to the “transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction 
of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational 
measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid 
increase in the number of warheads.” However, according to Bukharin & Luongo (1999), 
in the U.S. bureaucracy this statement was met with some confusion as to its actual mean-
ing, and resistance to warhead transparency persisted in some portions of Russia's bureau-
cracy. 
24  DOE (1996). 
25  In February 1996, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Hazel O’Leary, announced that the Uni-
ted States would produce a report detailing the production, use, disposition and inventor-
ies of HEU covering the past 50 years. She said the report would be completed in about 
one year. As of early 2002, the HEU report has still not materialized.  
26  DOE (1996), p. 5. After considering the arguments for the maintenance of previous levels 
of confidentiality about the stocks of fissile material required for national security rea-
sons, the British government in June 1988 concluded that there was no longer a need for 
complete confidentiality about these stocks, and declared their total stockpiles of pluto-
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Unfortunately, Russia has not released any official information on its 
fissile material stockpiles. Russian officials and laboratory experts have indi-
cated that the country lacks the funds for compiling such information in a 
format comparable to that used by the United States concerning its Pluto-
nium stockpile. This has led to a proposed lab-to-lab contract, whereby the 
United States would undertake to pay the cost of preparing an inventory of 
Russia’s plutonium stockpile in return for receiving information at the same 
level of detail as that already released by the U.S. 27 
Obstacles to transparency 
At first glance, transparency and security may seem like incompatible and 
conflicting interests: it may be argued that any openness is likely to harm the 
long-term security interests of a nation due to its loss of control of informa-
tion. Transparency measures could introduce the risk that classified, sensi-
tive or proprietary information might be compromised or released – with 
adverse impacts on national security and international obligations.28 Apart 
from the proliferation risks, this may increase vulnerability and lessen the 
(political) strength of the nation, as sensitive technical information and 
weaknesses could be revealed. Moreover, increased openness could make it 
easier for criminals and sub-national groups to divert fissile material unlaw-
fully, if government details of the physical protection systems and quantities 
and qualities of fissile material at facilities were to be made available.  
Some of the objections to transparency are clearly well founded and justi-
fied, based on proliferation risks. Others, however, may be outdated and 
based more on traditions of “instinctive” secrecy. Secretiveness has traditio-
nally had a special status within nuclear weapon complexes. Divulging tech-
nical information has been seen as being on a par with the surrender of sta-
tus, and has often been viewed as defeat.29 
Some guidelines would seem necessary to facilitate the delicate processes 
of transparency. For one thing, a transparency measure should generally not 
release information that could be damaging to the very nonproliferation 
interests it seeks to promote. Thus, detailed information concerning sensitive 
nuclear technology and physical protection of the material at each facility 
should not be released. Also industrial and proprietary rights could be har-
med by far-reaching transparency (e.g. at sites with cutting-edge MPC&A – 
Material Protection, Control and Accounting – technology), and should be 
protected to the extent possible. Normally, domestic and international agree-
ments and laws, derived from sensitive nuclear technology and physical pro-
tection requirements, have been established to prevent the dissipation of both 
sensitive information and information containing proprietary secrets. 
Moreover, practical limitations may hamper the introduction of 
transparency measures. Companies already contractors at one or more sites 
                                                     
nium and uranium held outside international safeguards. Moreover, a significant amount 
(4.4 tons of plutonium and over 9.0 tons of enriched uranium) of the stock has been made 
available for IAEA/Euroatom safeguards. From INFCIRC/570 Attachment. “United 
Kingdom Fissile Material Transparency, Safeguards and Irreversibility initiatives”. 
27  Bukharin & Luongo (1999), p. 23. If this worked well for plutonium, a similar approach 
could be taken for Russia’s HEU stockpiles once the U.S. has released its data.  
28  CSIS (2000), p. 54.  
29  Based on Schaper & Frank (1999), p. 59. 
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would want to stay in control of their technology and maintain a competitive 
edge. Nor should one underestimate the costs and possible impact on the 
operation of the facility that introducing transparency through monitoring 
could involve. Indeed, it would seem that the more transparency that is 
requested, the greater the cost.30  
If transparency measures are to proceed and gain momentum, all these 
factors must be dealt with in ways specifically designed for that purpose. 
While the technology applied may limit the negative impacts of increased 
insight (e.g. by the introduction of verification with information barriers), 
traditional secrecy could prove to be the most transparency-resistant 
obstacle, just as it has blocked the progress of joint U.S.–Russian security 
upgrades of Russia’s fissile material.  
                                                     
30  Mochiji et al. (1999), p. 48. 
Chapter 3:  
The naval fuel cycle and the lack of 
transparency  
All the five declared nuclear weapon states under the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty possess nuclear-propelled submarines. However, as nuclear weapon 
states, they are all exempted from international (IAEA) safeguards and other 
monitoring activities.31 Sensitivity issues and the strategic importance of 
nuclear submarines have led the nuclear weapon states to maintain a high 
degree of secrecy around their own nuclear naval operations. Very little is 
officially known about U.S. and Russian submarine nuclear fuel designs, 
production technology, operational data and naval fuel stocks.32  
The lack of transparency on the U.S. naval fuel cycle  
No official figures exist on the U.S. stockpiles of HEU for naval purposes or 
material destined for future naval consumption. Estimates indicate an overall 
consumption of HEU in U.S. reactors since the dawn of nuclear propulsion 
of approximately 120 tons – some 12% of the total U.S. HEU production of 
nearly 1,000 tons.33  
As the U.S. has stopped enriching HEU, the U.S. Navy relies solely on 
weapon stocks of HEU for its naval propulsion program. While this may 
complicate any introduction of transparency measures, portions of the U.S. 
HEU stockpile are already subject to somoe international verification: As 
part of its fissile material cut-off initiative launched in 1993, the Clinton 
Administration offered to allow the IAEA to inspect about 10 tons of HEU at 
the Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge in 1994.34 Furthermore, to demonstrate the U.S. 
commitment to irreversibility and the nuclear disarmament process, Presi-
dent Clinton announced in March 1995 that another 200 tons of fissile 
material would be permanently withdrawn from the U.S. nuclear weapon 
stockpile. Of this material, 173.4 tons is HEU, in many chemical forms.35  
                                                     
31  France and China use LEU in their submarines.  
32  See Appendix I for a technical description of U.S. and Russian naval nuclear propulsion 
programs.  
33  Maerli, unpublished working paper (1999) and Appendix I. 
34  The introduction of verification measures as part of the safeguards agreement with the 
United States was cumbersome and expensive for both the IAEA and the U.S. While 
intensive physical protection systems were in place to meet U.S. domestic requirements to 
protect against theft of the material, extensive modifications were necessary to allow the 
IAEA to apply containment and surveillance measures. Also, resolving complications 
associated with the stratification of the material, its packing, and other indigenous para-
meters or the facilities required time and money. New measurement techniques and 
instruments had to be developed to provide the required level of measurements accuracy. 
From Scheifer & Shea (1999). 
35  For a list of the locations and amounts of the excess material, see Albright et al.. (1997), 
pp. 92–93. See also DOE Office of Fissile Material Disposition. “Surplus HEU Disposi-
tion”. http://twilight.saic.com/md/disp-1.asp 
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Still, there is only 12 tons of excess fissile material under international 
safeguards at three U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities.36 In addi-
tion, approximately 50 tons of excess HEU were being down-blended at an 
NRC-licensed37 facility under international safeguards.38 These down-blend-
ing operations began late 1999 and will continue for six years. However, 
none of the material currently placed under international safeguards is desig-
nated or suitable for the naval fuel cycle.  
In fact, the U.S. Navy has been proceeding with extreme caution, keeping 
in military reserve all the fissile material usable for naval propulsion. The 
low proportion of higher enrichment levels in HEU declared excess to natio-
nal security needs stems from U.S. Navy insistence that such material be 
reserved for its possible future needs. With the exception of the first 10 tons 
declared excess, all of the HEU that the U.S. has declared excess failed to 
meet the specifications for use in naval fuel.39 Of the 174.3 excess tons of 
HEU, about 33 tons are enriched over 92%, and 142 tons are enriched 
between 20 to 92%.  
Moreover, the pledges given by the U.S. that no fuel ever put under inter-
national safeguards will be withdrawn for military purposes do not apply to 
the Navy. It could withdraw HEU that has been declared excess to national 
security needs and put under safeguards, to use it as naval reactor fuel.40 
However, the Navy has never evoked its unique pullback option. The U.S. 
Navy plans well and probably does not intend to use currently safeguarded 
excess material for its programs; moreover, attempting to do so would a 
steep uphill political climb.  The policy of withdrawal allowance should 
undergo review, as it is likely to undermine the evolving norm of irreversi-
bility in nuclear arms control. 
The lack of transparency on the Russian naval fuel cycle  
As is the case for the U.S., no official figures exist today on Russia’s stock-
piles of fissile material in general, or on its naval stocks in particular. Trans-
parency is extremely limited.41 Estimates, all of them involving huge uncer-
tainties, indicate a remaining military HEU stock in Russia of 1,010 tons at 
the end of 1997, including the 500 tons of HEU slated for sale to the United 
States under the U.S.–Russian HEU deal. Russia’s overall HEU naval fuel 
production through the year 2000 alone is estimated at more than 140 tons.42 
Russia alone may now hold as much as 80 to 85 metric tons of HEU for 
naval propulsion.43 This proliferation-attractive material has never been 
exposed to international or bilateral control or safeguards. 
                                                     
36  According to Bukharin & Luongo (1999), p. 18, ten tons of the fissile material under 
IAEA inspections at DOE facilities is HEU. 
37  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
38  Withworth (2000), DOE International Safeguards Division, personal communication. 
February 4, 2000.   
39  Apparently, some of the first 10 tons of HEU declared as surplus could meet the specifi-
cations for use as naval fuel, according to Bunn, (2000), p. 54.  
40  Albright et al. (1997), p. 93.  
41  The HEU covered by the U.S.–Russian HEU deal is an exception where transparency is in 
place. Cf. the section “Voluntary, non-intrusive verification on designated parts of the 
naval fuel cycle”. 
42  Maerli, unpublished working paper and Appendix I. 
43  Hibbs (1995), p. 12.  
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However, as part of ongoing efforts to secure fissile material in Russia, 
the joint U.S.–Russian MPC&A upgrading at naval facilities has been quite 
successful, and clearly better able to deal with the sensitivity issues hamper-
ing other parts of the assistance program.44 The DOE has forged close work-
ing relationships with officials in the Russian Navy, overcome security con-
cerns about the location of the naval fuel, and gained access to install physi-
cal protection systems and accountancy systems at these centralized but still 
sensitive sites. This may be a sound start for future transparency on the Rus-
sian naval nuclear fuel cycle.45 
The lack of safeguards on naval nuclear cycles in non-nuclear 
weapon states 
Naval nuclear stockpiles outside the nuclear weapon states may also consti-
tute a potential problem. Paragraph 14 of the comprehensive IAEA safe-
guards agreement under the NPT allows any state to withdraw nuclear 
material for peaceful uses from safeguards if it is being used for a “non-pro-
scribed military activity”.46 Thus, naval nuclear fuel may represent a loop-
hole for nuclear weapon production even outside the nuclear weapon states. 
True, the safeguards agreement stresses that, during the period of non-appli-
cation of safeguards, the nuclear material must not be used for the produc-
tion of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. However, there 
is no prohibition of the non-explosive use of nuclear material, equipment or 
technology for a military purpose such as the propulsion of naval ship. 
Against this backdrop, concerns have been voiced that the naval fuel cycle 
could be used as a back door to nuclear weapons.47  
A non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT that wishes to acquire 
enriched uranium for submarine propulsion could either invoke the para-
graph 14 exemption or could avoid IAEA safeguards entirely by obtaining 
unsafeguarded material from a nuclear weapon state or a non-NPT state.48 
The latter is possible because the NPT requires safeguards only on special 
fissionable material provided to a non-nuclear weapon state for peaceful 
nuclear activities.49  
More far-reaching scenarios could include non-nuclear weapon states 
under the NPT building uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication plants for 
the production of submarine fuel and claiming that the material is not subject 
to IAEA safeguards since it is dedicated to non-proscribed military use. 
There would be no means for verifying that the material and facilities were 
not being misused to make nuclear weapons. In either case, the result would 
be that some of the HEU in a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT 
would not be subject to IAEA safeguards. This loophole was deliberately 
introduced into the treaty to accommodate some of the states involved in the 
negotiations and who were considering acquiring nuclear-propelled naval 
                                                     
44  Maerli (2000). 
45  Ibid.  
46  INFCIRC/153 Corrected: “The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency 
and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons.” 
47  See e.g. Sanders & Simpson (1988), Miller (1992) and Moltz (1998). 
48  Miller (1992), p. 160.  
49  The Non-Proliferation Treaty, article III. 2.  
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craft and wished to avoid foreign inspections, accountable to an international 
organization, on board such ships.50  
Increased transparency in the naval fuel cycle can also be paramount for 
the U.S. goal of prompting a resumption of negotiations on the next key 
multilateral step in the nuclear disarmament process: a treaty to ban the pro-
duction of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.51 If a future Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty is to be implemented 
with a high level of confidence that no clandestine HEU diversion is taking 
place, and to bolster the HEU stockpile accounting and control under such a 
treaty, then the non-explosive uses of HEU (e.g. naval uses) must comprise 
part of the agreement. 
The strategic importance of submarines makes probable a sustained inter-
est in nuclear submarine propulsion across the world.52 Moreover, Russia’s 
emphasis on floating reactors to provide energy to remote areas may lead to 
increased use and possible future exports of naval reactor technology and 
HEU fuel. Guidelines and a regime have been proposed and advocated to 
limit the potential impact of the current HEU loophole in the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty –without significant political support so far.53 A related approach 
for increasing international confidence in non-diversion of naval fuel would 
involve establishing a norm of increased, voluntary transparency. If imple-
mented, such a norm could boost long-term nuclear safety of both non-
nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states. In the following, the pos-
sible components of such a transparency standard will be discussed.  
 
                                                     
50  See note 57 above.  
51  On the U.S. commitment to an FMCT, see Speech by John D. Holum, Acting Under 
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, and Director, 
Arms Control And Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Geneva, 21 January 1999.  
http://www.acronym.org.uk/cdholum.htm  
52  Canada has abandoned its long-term nuclear submarine ambitions, but Brazil has persis-
ted in its nuclear submarine plans. Other interested states are India and Pakistan. An alter-
native put forward by Moltz and Robinson (1999) is the possibility of states buying 
decommissioned nuclear Russian submarines. Apparently, India has expressed interest in 
Russian nuclear submarines, opening up for possible transfers also to other interested sta-
tes, such as. India’s rival Pakistan or others. For the Russians, this could be an attractive 
option, as it would open the potential of badly needed revenue to Russian shipyards which 
have been facing deep cuts in orders for the commissioning of new submarines. Revenues 
would further be secured through subsequent repair contracts and the necessary training of 
personnel, and of course continuous provisions of naval fuel. Secondly, the early removal 
of decommissioned ships would ease the pressures on current dismantlement activities 
and thus on the potential environmental impacts due to leakages and already exhausted 
storage facilities. All the same, such a “nuclear submarine flea market” does not seem to 
be a very realistic option. Due to the presence of valuable scrap metals, the recycling 
value of the submarine may even exceed the price that states would be willing to pay for a 
second-hand submarine. Estimates (by retired Colonel Aleksandr I. Kurchatov, quoted in 
Moltz & Robinson (1999)), indicate recoups of only 20 to 30% of the dismantlement 
costs; however, these figures are uncertain. “Warranty” and liability problems could also 
complicate future sales. However, the possibility underscores a fundamental and possibly 
increasing problem associated with the naval components of the NPT. 
53  Guidelines for supply of submarine reactors and submarine launched missiles have been 
suggested by Sanders & Simpson (1988); a suppliers’ “Nuclear Propulsion Reactor Con-
trol Regime” has been presented by Moltz (1998).  
Chapter 4:  
Components of a naval nuclear fuel 
transparency regime  
The introduction of transparency on sensitive items will have to balance 
carefully the information extracted against security and classification con-
cerns. All the same, there seem to be good prospects of such measures being 
implemented on the sensitive naval fuel cycle, as political acceptance of the 
concept of transparency is emerging. This could, together with the new 
technical opportunities of high-quality and non-intrusive verification mea-
sures, create an important foundation for new transparency initiatives.54 
The naval nuclear fuel transparency measures could include the following 
as part of a more comprehensive, future transparency regime: 55  
  
– declarations of total HEU quantities dedicated to naval propulsion (inclu-
ding estimates of future needs)  
– voluntary, non-intrusive verification on designated parts of the naval fuel 
cycle  
– description of all facilities used for producing naval fuel, including pro-
duction records and material balances for each facility  
– information on the status of each naval fuel batch (whether fresh fuel/ 
spent fuel, in storage, or in operating reactors, and its final disposition) 
and location of the material 
– an account of any fissile material removed from the naval inventory, such 
as:  
– material consumed during operation 
– material transferred to the national surplus stockpile and/or down-
blended to LEU (low-enriched uranium)  
– declarations of any naval fuel placed under international safeguards.  
 
Declarations on the status of the fuel batches, estimates of future fuel needs 
and the accounting of material removed from the naval cycle should be made 
regularly, perhaps on an annual basis. In the following, each of the items 
above will be discussed in more detail, and on-going and related nuclear 
arms-control activities will be presented.  
                                                     
54  Maerli (2000). 
55  This section builds partly on Fetter’s discussion on transparency for fissile material 
stocks. See Fetter. (1996), pp. 14–20, as well as the Principal Recommendations given in 
National Academy of Sciences (1994).  
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Declarations of the total HEU quantities dedicated to naval 
propulsion 
Due to major uncertainties as to current stocks of fissile material, both initial 
and regular declarations are particularly important. Confidence in the decla-
rations given would be boosted if non-intrusive spot checks of these declara-
tions were permitted.56 Information on the mass, chemical and isotopic com-
position (enrichment) of the fuel is desirable because it promote greater 
confidence in the declarations, but this may also raise the risk of revealing 
and disseminating highly sensitive proliferation information.  
The total declared quantities of uranium and the annual consumption 
levels can be estimated on the basis of operating history and other open-
source information. Other countries – or, under bilateral U.S.–Russian trans-
parency agreements, the U.S. and Russia – can evaluate whether the quantity 
declared for naval purposes appears plausible on the basis of its understand-
ing of the number, the power, and operating patterns of the reactors. Their 
inspectors should verify that the amounts being released into the naval fuel 
cycle match the declarations.57  
Moreover, as spent naval fuel will be less proliferation-attractive (due to 
the high radiation levels), early transparency measures could focus on verify-
ing the status of the spent fuel. At the back end of the fuel cycle, if the spent 
fuel were reprocessed, inspectors could check the weights and assays of the 
recovered uranium and plutonium. It would also be possible to assess decla-
rations of the amounts of uranium-235 that had been fissioned by measuring 
the quantity of uranium-236 in the residual uranium.58 
Formalized agreements already exist for some fissile material stockpile 
declarations. One example is the guidelines agreed to by the five declared 
nuclear weapon states under the NPT, together with Belgium, Germany, 
Japan and Switzerland, to increase the transparency of the management of 
civil plutonium by publishing annual statements of each country’s holdings 
of civilian plutonium.59 In principle, these guidelines cover all plutonium in 
all peaceful activities, but focus on the material that poses the greatest pro-
liferation concern: Separated plutonium, whether in storage, in unirradiated 
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel elements, in other unirradiated fabricated forms, or 
in the course of manufacture or fabrication into these items. The guidelines 
also apply to plutonium declared excess to military nuclear programs. Pluto-
nium in spent fuel is not the focus of the guidelines, but each country has 
agreed to publish annual estimates of the amount of plutonium in its spent 
nuclear fuel. 
The nine nations which have agreed to the guidelines will publish:  
                                                     
56  E.g. with inspections performed with equipment with information barriers.  
57  FAS (1991), pp. 15–16. 
58  When a uranium-235 atom absorbs a slow neutron in a reactor, the probability of fission 
resulting is somewhat less than 90%. Non-fission absorption results in the formation of 
uranium-236, which has a half-life of 24 million years. The percentage of uranium -236 in 
a sample therefore reflects the amounts of uranium-235 which have been fissioned. Due to 
neutron absorption and further decay, more exact estimates of the quantities of uranium-
235 fissioned would involve measurements of some other isotopes as well. From FAS 
(1991) , p. 19.  
59  In 1998, the IAEA published its Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIR/ 
549). See also Albright & Barbour (1999b). 
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– occasional brief statements explaining their national strategy for nuclear 
power and spent fuel, and their general plans for managing national hold-
ings of plutonium  
– annual statements of their holdings of all plutonium subject to the guide-
lines 
– annual statements of their estimate of the plutonium contained in their 
holdings of spent civil reactor fuel.  
 
These annual publications of the civil holdings have been generally success-
ful in creating more transparency. However, in accordance with the goal of 
universal membership and adherence, more countries possessing civilian 
plutonium need to be involved. Still, the plutonium declarations could serve 
as a useful model for future naval fuel declarations. 
Voluntary, non-intrusive verification on designated parts of 
the naval fuel cycle 
Any forms of verification allowed to be performed on the sensitive naval 
fuel cycles are likely to boost confidence in declarations and the overall 
transparency. Also here, the challenge is to protect classified information 
while allowing the inspecting party to draw independent and accurate con-
clusions.  
Some elements of a fissile verification regime for sensitive HEU stocks 
have already been introduced, both through bilateral and trilateral agree-
ments. The U.S.–Russian HEU deal and the trilateral IAEA–U.S.–Russian 
cooperation to remove excess material from military stocks have generated 
verification and monitoring measures, all within acceptable ranges of the 
nuclear weapon states involved.60 Such measures, briefly described in the 
following, may provide an important point of departure for future non-intru-
sive HEU verification of the naval fuel cycle. 
The HEU deal 
February 1993 saw the signing of the Agreement between the Government 
of the United States and the Government of the Russian Federation Concern-
ing the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear 
Weapons. This HEU deal allowed, for the first time, the conversion of wea-
pon-grade nuclear material from dismantled warheads to commercial reactor 
fuel for electricity generation. Commonly referred to as “Megatons to Mega-
watts”, the deal had, by the end of 1999, resulted in the dilution of over 35 
tons of weapons-usable uranium. In many ways, the HEU deal may consti-
tute the single most important nonproliferation measure introduced bilate-
rally, covering a significant part of Russia’s weapon stockpile of HEU.  
After a slow start and organizational difficulties, implementation of the 
agreement is accelerating and new transparency measures have been 
installed. For the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), there are three trans-
                                                     
60  In September 1996, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy 
and the Director General of the IAEA initiated discussions on practical measures concern-
ing IAEA verification of fissile material of excess weapon origin. 
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parency objectives. Firstly, that the HEU is extracted from nuclear weapons, 
secondly, that the same HEU is oxidized, and finally that the HEU is blended 
into LEU.61 For MINATOM,62 the transparency objective is that the LEU is 
fabricated into fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors.63  
Portable instruments are used to confirm the presence of HEU in wea-
pons-component containers; once the component has been removed from the 
unique shipping container, U.S. monitors use the instruments to confirm that 
no HEU remains in the container. The portable units determine the level of 
U-235 enrichment of metal chips that results from the machining of the HEU 
metal components from the weapons.64 Even though the choice fell on a 
system less intrusive and less likely to reveal sensitive information, after 
over two years of operation, all its measurements had been consistent with 
the declared enrichment.65 
The Trilateral initiative 
The removal of weapon-origin fissile material from the defense programs of 
Russia and the U.S. furthers the obligations of the two states under the 
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Trilateral Initiative would 
place both excess U.S. fissile material and excess Russian fissile material 
stored at the Mayak facility (in the Chelyabinsk region) under IAEA safe-
guards. Progress has been made toward completing a model verification 
agreement that will serve as the basis for implementing the new verification 
measures. Unfortunately, progress on these measures has been slow, both 
because the measures overlap with the U.S.–Russian negotiations on Mayak 
transparency and because concerns about protecting sensitive information 
from international inspections remain.66 
Under the Trilateral initiative, the requirement is not to verify the wea-
pons origin of HEU and plutonium but to promote international confidence 
in the assurance that the material is not used in the production of new wea-
pons. The aim is to provide transparency on the steps taken to reduce the 
stocks of fissile material potentially available for the use in nuclear weapon 
programs.67 Thus, the commitments to the initiative must be irrevocable, and 
verification must follow from storage through the disposition activities, 
remaining in effect until the fissile material is rendered no longer usable in 
nuclear weapons. 
To begin the trilateral IAEA verification as early as possible, special 
technical provisions are being developed that will allow the two states to 
submit dismantled nuclear weapon components or other classified forms of 
fissile material, with the assurance that IAEA inspectors will not acquire 
                                                     
61  While this is clearly the goal to verify that the LEU shipped originates from Russian wea-
pons, doubts have been raised whether the measurements really can determine if the HEU 
is of weapons origin.  
62  Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy 
63  Mastal et al. (1999).  
64  Ibid. (1999). 
65  Decman et al. (1999). 
66  Bukharin. & Luongo (1999), p. 10. 
67  Thus, the verification arrangements that will be implemented are likely to involve not so 
much meeting specific goals in relation to the manufacture of a single nuclear weapon, as 
is the case for IAEA nonproliferation safeguards, but the amounts of fissile material main-
tained under monitored storage, use (e.g. down-blended HEU), and immobilization.  
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information relating to the design or manufacture of such weapons.68 The 
U.S. will ensure that the material (and facilities) which it has opened for 
international inspection will not provide IAEA inspectors with proliferation-
sensitive information. This is to be accomplished by vulnerability assess-
ments, by limiting the information given to international inspectors to that 
has been determined to be safeguard-relevant and mission-essential.69  
Important progress has been made in developing and testing verification 
equipment. A prototype verification system for plutonium has been built and 
demonstrated (under conditions expected in the field) at the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory. This prototype combines standard non-destructive 
measurement techniques with a new technology known as “information bar-
riers” designed to allow inspectors to derive sufficient, credible information 
for verification, while preventing access to classified information. The proto-
type provides a means to evaluate previously identified concepts. Tests have 
shown that verification under the security constraints could meet the security 
exigencies of the states and the verification requirements of the IAEA.70 As 
equipment for HEU measurements evolve, the techniques and procedures are 
probably applicable to the sensitive naval fuel cycle as well.  
Description of naval fuel-producing facilities  
Better knowledge of the production history of naval fuel-producing facilities 
ensures against clandestine production, simultaneously raising confidence 
that no such production is taking place. The introduction of transparency 
measures on naval fuel production facilities will be challenging, but ongoing 
international work may support such efforts.  
The new Model Protocol, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) represents an 
attempt to broaden the scope of international safeguards with much more 
comprehensive declarations.71 Under this safeguards protocol, states are 
required to declare and submit to international control all nuclear material 
production facilities, whether operating or not. Many of the same set of pro-
visions is likely to be included in a future Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, to 
avoid covert weapon production and suspicion of such activities. Again, it 
can be worth exploring the symbiotic effects on the naval fuel cycle, con-
cerning naval fuel production facilities in particular.  
The status of naval fuel batches 
It may be desirable to have descriptions and inspections at such production 
facilities as the Russian Electrostal's fabrication line for highly enriched 
uranium fuel, but this is unlikely to be accepted due to sensitivity problems. 
                                                     
68  IAEA (1999) “IAEA Verification of Weapon-Origin Fissile Material in the Russian Fede-
ration and the United States”. Press release September 27,1999. 
 http://www.iaea.org/GC/gc43/gc_pr/gcpr9910.html 
69  Withworth, A. (2000), DOE International Safeguards Division, personal communication, 
February 4, 2000.  
70  IAEA (1999) “IAEA Verification of Weapon-Origin Fissile Material in the Russian Fede-
ration and the United States”. Press release 09.27.1999.  
http://www.iaea.org/GC/gc43/gc_pr/gcpr9910.html 
71  IAEA, INFCIRC/54 (Corrected), Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between 
State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, 
<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdf>.  
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Alternatives to boost confidence in non-diversion could therefore be 
explored. By introducing tags and seals on the transportation containers leav-
ing the production facility, fuel batches could be tracked throughout the fuel 
cycle, from the production line to temporary storage, up to the stage when 
the fuel is introduced into the reactors. The container tags could be reapplied 
after submarines have been refueled/defueled, tracking the fuel to the point 
of final disposition or use (or down-blending).  
An account of fissile material removed from the naval 
inventory 
Whether the removal of fissile material occurs through consumption or 
transfers, any and all material removed from the naval stockpiles should be 
accounted for. Declared consumption levels may again be checked against 
estimates based on open-source information and submarine operating his-
tory. In the event that naval fuel is put under international safeguards, speci-
fic declarations should be made.  
Chapter 5:  
Conclusion and recommendations 
The lack of transparency on the naval fuel cycles is likely to be detrimental 
to long-term nuclear security of both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear 
weapon states. The persistent interest in naval nuclear propulsion around the 
world, possible exports of Russian naval reactor technology, and the tempt-
ing naval nuclear loophole in the NPT safeguards agreement – all of these 
could create new HEU markets beyond international control. The need for an 
international transparency norm to increase confidence in non-diversion of 
highly enriched naval fuel to clandestine nuclear weapon production may 
therefore be stronger than anticipated. 
The components of the transparency regime for naval fuel proposed here 
represent a minimal, non-intrusive approach to avoid the disclosure of sensi-
tive information while at the same time providing a way of increasing the 
confidence in non-diversion of naval fuel to nuclear weapon production. 
Today there is growing political interest in nuclear transparency in general. 
Technical transparency solutions that might be applied on the naval fuel 
cycle are evolving in related nuclear arms-control arenas.  
Thus, a step-wise approach, allowing to increase the confidence of the 
international community and potential opponents in non-diversion of the 
highly proliferation attractive naval fuel to clandestine weapon production, 
should be considered. In particular, such a transparency regime could consist 
of a combination of voluntary declarations of quantities and qualities of mat-
erial destined for naval consumption, and, desirably, non-intrusive spot-
checks on strategic points along the fuel cycle.  
Experience from bilateral nuclear security cooperation with Russia has 
shown that cooperative programs can succeed only if they are carried out as 
true partnerships, as ventures serving both Russian and American interests.72 
To create the proper environment for naval fuel transparency measures, the 
U.S. could take the lead and reiterate and expand U.S.–Russian transparency 
efforts, tailoring the transparency measures to fit Russia’s own interests by 
offering strategic, technical and financial incentives. A valuable foundation 
for non-intrusive transparency on the Russian naval fuel cycle has been cre-
ated by the highly successful cooperative naval fuel security upgrades, due 
to the close working relations established and the ongoing consolidation of 
fuel to a limited set of storages.  
To support these efforts, the U.S. could consider allowing surplus naval 
fuel to be included in the national declarations of excess nuclear material. 
Additionally, it could abandon its current option of allowing nuclear materi-
als to be withdrawn from international safeguards for the use as naval fuel.73  
                                                     
72  Bunn (2000), p. 4. 
73  The current policy does not violate any written agreements, but it conflicts with the spirit 
and intentions of voluntary, irreversible declarations of excess material and undermines 
the (political) impact of these delicate efforts at international control and confirmation of 
non-diversion. 

Appendix I:  
U.S. and Russian Naval Fuel – Current 
and Future Needs74 
In this appendix the current and future needs of naval fuel in the U.S. and 
Russia are assessed, as part of an investigation of how well and how easy a 
future naval fuel transparency regime may be implemented politically,. The 
United States and Russia both have extensive naval propulsion programs 
which use highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the reactor cores. Their naval 
programs involve by far the largest fleets globally.75 The naval fuel cycle 
represents some 10 to 15% of the total HEU economy in both states.  
For various reasons, fuel requirements in the two countries are likely to 
be reduced over the coming decades. While the overall U.S. naval fuel 
requirement will be reduced mainly due to the introduction of life-time reac-
tor cores and some decline in the number of operating reactors, Russian 
naval HEU consumption will continue to decrease due to the Russian Navy’s 
reduced operational status and severe fleet reductions. Ideally, such reduced 
fuel demands could serve to facilitate the implementation of non-intrusive, 
voluntary transparency measures on proliferation-attractive fresh naval fuel.  
This appendix scrutinizes current U.S. and Russian stockpiles and future 
needs of HEU for naval propulsion. Both navies maintain a high degree of 
secrecy around their nuclear operations, and very little is declared officially 
about submarine nuclear fuel designs, production technology, and operatio-
nal data. However, assessments of the current and future naval fuel economy 
can be made on the basis of the number of operating vessels and other avail-
able open-source information.  
                                                     
74  Thanks to John Finn and Bob van der Zwaan at the Center for International Security and 
Cooperation, Stanford University, for useful comments during the preparation of this 
appendix.  
75  As elucidated throughout this text and the text in Appendix II, naval reactors and com-
mercial reactors differ in size, number of fuel assemblies, fuel enrichment, power output 
and core lifetimes. Naval reactors use uranium fuel enriched in the range 20 to 97.3% U-
235; the rectors are extremely compact with active core heights of approximately 1 m. 
Fuel used in commercial light-water reactors is normally enriched to U-235 concentrati-
ons ranging from under 1% to over 4%, with typical enrichments close to 3%. Within the 
core of a given reactor, enrichments vary with the location of the fuel assemblies. The 
commercial pressurized water reactor, like other light-water reactors, operates with uran-
ium fuel in the form of uranium oxide ceramic pellets that are stacked in zirconium alloy 
tubes some 5 m long and 9 millimeters in diameter. Typically 25% of the 50,000 fuel rods 
of a commercial reactor, which represent 100 tons of fuel in a reactor, are replaced each 
year (representing about 40 fuel assemblies, each containing 264 fuel rods and some neu-
tron absorbers and positions for control rods). Depending on the core design and operat-
ing modes, submarines are generally refueled once every seven to ten years. The power 
outputs of the huge commercial reactors range from 600 MW to 1500 MW, while com-
pact submarine reactors typically produce outputs between 30 MW to 50 MW, i.e. 
approximately 5% of the commercial outputs.  
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U.S. naval program 
U.S. naval nuclear propulsion reactors use uranium enriched to at least 93% 
in U-235.76 This is material that is directly useable in nuclear weapons.77 On 
the basis of estimates during the 1980s, Cochran et al. found that a U.S. sub-
marine reactor core contains an average of 200 kg of U-235 enriched to 
97.3%, the rest of the core being U-238.78 Larger as well as smaller core 
loads are possible, but such enrichment levels are supported by other open-
source information.79 Over the years U.S. naval reactor technology has 
improved, increasing both the power output and the overall performance of 
submarines, and leading to a steady increase in the core lifetimes of reac-
tors.80 Today’s U.S. submarines put to sea with reactors that will last the life 
of the ship, obviating the need for refueling.81  
Naval fuel is highly robust and designed to operate for many years in a 
high-temperature, high-pressure environment.82 To ensure that it will be cap-
able of withstanding battle shock loads, naval fuel is surrounded by large 
amounts of zirconium alloy.83 Further exploitation of the modified fuel pro-
cess and better understanding of various reactor technologies that permit 
more optimized designs will further increase the energy density for the next 
generation of naval reactors. Currently, new structural material, coolant 
chemistries, reactor plant arrangements, and core configurations are being 
investigated by the U.S. Naval Reactors.84 
Forty percent of the combatant ships of the U.S. Navy are nuclear pow-
ered, including all U.S. submarines and 75% of the aircraft carriers.85 Taking 
into account also the naval prototypes, 103 U.S. naval reactors were operat-
ing as of October 1999 (see table A1).86 This makes the number of U.S. 
naval reactors comparable to the number of commercial power reactors in 
the U.S. This is also nearly equal to the number of reactors in the next two 
largest commercial nuclear power-producing countries, France and Japan, 
                                                     
76  Director, Naval Propulsion Program (1995), p. 35. 
77  The HEU used in U.S. nuclear weapons is enriched to 93.5%. (Roser, 1983, quoted in 
Chow & Solomon 1993, p. 5, footnote 5). 
78  Assuming approximately 20 new fuel cores procured per year, and an annual consumption 
of 5 metric tons of fuel. (Cochran et al., 1987, p. 71.) In addition to the U-238 fraction, 
some U-234 remnants from the enrichment process are probable. 
79  E.g. Miller (1992), p. 157, and von Hippel & Levi (1986b), p. 367.  
80  Director Naval Propulsion Program (1995), p. 3.  
81  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Classification Review (1995), p. 3.  
82  Cores with a high power density will inevitably face heat-transfer problems. The most 
practical solution is to use flat plates instead of pins. Such dispersion fuel creates a larger 
surface area through which the heat released by the fissions can escape, increasing perfor-
mance and output; it is now widely used as submarine fuel. The highly enriched uranium 
fuel in U.S. submarine reactors is dispersed within another material, called a matrix, and 
clad with a third material, to make a fuel plate. Material used in the reactor cores needs a 
low absorption cross section for neutrons, in order not to increase the amount of fission-
able material required. The uranium powder can be uranium oxide or uranium aluminides 
and uranium silicides. From Eriksen (1990), pp. 45–48, and Simpson (1995), pp. 332–
333.  
83  Beckett 1998, quoted in DOE appendix: Inventory and Characteristics of Spent Nuclear 
Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Other Material. p. A-29.  
84  DOE (1998). Features sought are enhanced power density, longer life of the cores, decrea-
sed weight, increased resilience, reduced corrosion, ease of operation, and affordability. 
85  The reactors in the U.S. Navy's warships have over 115 million miles steamed on nuclear 
power, or a total of 5,000 reactor years of operation. 
86  Based on Sharpe (1999), pp. 789–838, and personal communication with personnel at the 
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Directorate.  
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combined. All U.S. naval reactors are of the light-water pressurized type 
(PWR).87 
 
 
Table A1. U.S. naval reactors operating as of October 1999  
 
During the 1990s, the U.S. ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force was 
reduced from 32 submarines (armed with 584 missiles and 5024 warheads) 
to 18 submarines (carrying 432 missiles with 3456 warheads).93 In 1990, 23 
of the active submarines dated from the 1960s. In contrast, today’s SSBN 
fleet consists entirely of Ohio-class submarines.  
The fleet of attack submarines (SSNs) included more than 90 boats 
throughout most of the 1980s, and peaked at 98 boats in 1987.94 The number 
of operating U.S. attack submarines is dropping as the U.S. Navy is remodel-
ing its submarine force for the 21st century. Today, 82 fast-attack submarines 
are assigned to the Atlantic and Pacific Submarine Forces,95 56 of which are 
nuclear propelled. The older SSNs, some of them launched back in the 1960s 
and 70s, will successively be decommissioned and replaced by the New 
Attack Submarines (NSSNs). In September 1999, the keel was laid for the 
U.S. Navy’s first new nuclear attack submarine, USS Virginia, the lead ship 
in what will be called the Virginia-class submarines. 
The U.S. fleet has undergone extensive modernization and reductions in 
recent decades. Between 1995 and the end of 1999, the number of operating 
reactors was reduced from 158 to 103. The reactor fuel and core vendor 
industrial base has shrunk in response to the downsizing of the Navy follow-
ing the breakup of the Soviet Union, and in response to the reduced require-
ments due to the continuously increasing lifetimes achieved in HEU-reactor 
                                                     
87  With a machinery output in the range of 26 MW to 45 MW for submarines in the current 
fleet (SSNs and SSBNs, respectively). From Sharpe (1999), pp. 789–838. 
88  Ballistic missile nuclear submarine. 
89  Nuclear-powered attack submarine. 
90  Deep Submergence Craft, a nuclear-powered ocean engineering and research submarine.  
91  USS Enterprise (the first nuclear aircraft carrier built) has eight reactors. The other eight 
carriers are of the Nimitz-class with two operating reactors each. 
92  Land-based reactors for training and research and development. There are four facilities, 
each with one reactor.  
93  Arkin & Kristensen (1998).  
94  The Benjamin Franklin class, the Sturgeon class, the Los Angeles class, the Seawolf class 
and the Virginia class. 
95  As of September 21, 1999. Source: U.S. Submarine Warfare Division, 
 http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/n87.html  
Type of vessel  Number 
of vessels 
Number of reac-
tors in vessel 
Total number 
of reactors 
SSBN88  18 1 18 
SSN89 56 1 56 
NR-190  1 1 1 
Nuclear aircraft carriers91 9 2 (8) 16 + 8 
Prototypes92 4 1 4 
SUM  88  103 
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cores.96 The United States is now disposing of reactors from decommissi-
oned ships at the rate of about six per year.97  
Future U.S. naval reactors and fuel consumption levels 
No new SSBNs are currently projected, but existing U.S. Department of 
Defense guidelines call for a force of 50 attack submarines, although some 
studies have called for raising the number to as many as 72.98 As for the stra-
tegic vessels, the same uncertainties in out-year projections of the defense 
budget render the future SSN manufacture uncertain. Under the most exten-
sive plans, the U.S. Navy plans to spend USD 64 billion to acquire 30 New 
Attack Submarines by the year 2016.99 These purchases will allow the Navy 
to maintain its force-structure goal of 50 boats. Higher numbers would 
require modifications to current plans.100 
The future deployment of other types of naval reactors is also fairly con-
stant. The new carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) and the new CVN77 
will replace older, conventional aircraft carriers taken out of operation.101 
The Navy is likely to keep two prototypes for R&D on energy efficiency and 
training of personnel.102 In the course of 1999, DOE inactivated and defu-
eled six shutdown prototype reactor plants.103 The NR-1, a nuclear-powered 
ocean engineering and research submarine, continues its service to the Navy 
and many research and educational institutions. This vessel was overhauled 
and refueled in 1993 after an operating period of 24 years.104  
The U.S. Navy buys reactor cores many years before they are actually 
loaded: a ten-year advance procurement seems customary. As of 1995 
enough HEU was already available to cover projected U.S. naval require-
ments until about 2006.105 As the portion of the Portsmouth enrichment 
plant that made weapons-grade uranium was closed in 1992, naval reactors 
now depend on the existing inventory of weapons-grade uranium. The U.S 
produced 994 tons of HEU from 1945 to 1992, when production ended.106 
However, the amount of HEU already used or incorporated into weapons has 
yet not been declassified. As part of its openness policy, DOE expects to 
complete a report in which it will detail the U.S. production, acquisition, 
uses, inventories and disposition of HEU from 1945. 
                                                     
96  Director Naval Propulsion Program (1995), p. 21. 
97  U.S. Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson before the Committee on Armed Services Sub-
committee on Military Procurement U.S. House of Representatives, March 4, 1999. 
http://www.doe.gov/news/testimon/cas3499.htm 
98  FAS (1999).  
99  GAO (1998).  
100  Other options reviewed (October 1999) by the Joint Chief of Staff include: Converting 
older Ohio-class SSBN submarines to so-called SSGNs at a cost of $420 million; refuel-
ing and extending by 12 years the service life of perhaps eight Los Angeles-class (SSN 
688) subs at a cost per copy of $200 million; or building new Virginia-class (SSN 774) 
subs at a rate of at least four over the next five years, at a cost of roughly $2 billion each. 
From FAS (1999). 
101  Sharpe (1999), p. 801. To maintain a fleet of 12 carriers an additional aircraft carrier, 
CX1, will be needed by the year 2007. 
102  Albright et al. (1997), p. 87.  
103 U.S. Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson before the Committee on Armed Services Sub-
committee on Military Procurement U.S. House of Representatives, March 4, 1999. 
http://www.doe.gov/news/testimon/cas3499.htm 
104  Sharpe (1999), p. 838. 
105  Schmitt, quoted in National Academy of Sciences (1995), p. 165. 
106  DOE/EIA (1998), p. 13. 
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Over its lifetime, the U.S. naval propulsion program has designed, built 
and operated more than 30 distinct types of reactors.107 Early naval reactors 
had a lifetime of about two to four years. A modern attack submarine (SSN) 
has a ship life of approximately 30 years. On the basis of statistics of U.S. 
Navy reactor cores, a study in the 1980s assumed a ten-year average life for 
reactor cores.108 This figure is supported by more recent studies109 that have 
indicated the need for refueling twice during the normal lifetime of the cur-
rent vessels. The Navy is currently designing reactor cores to last 50 years 
for aircraft carriers, 40 years for SSBNs, and 30 years for SSNs.110 These 
core developments would eliminate the need for submarine refueling alto-
gether.111 
The operation modes of strategic nuclear submarines will be on a lower 
energy output than the faster attack submarines, prolonging the lifetimes of 
their cores. The cores of the last of the Ohio-class submarines, designed in 
the late 1970s, will operate for over 20 years without refueling.112 The last 
Ohio-class submarine with this core technology was delivered in 1996.113 If 
a strategic U.S. force is to be maintained, however, a new class of SSBNs 
must be built to replace the current Ohio class. By the time this new class of 
ships is designed, a 45-year HEU core should be feasible for submarines.114 
The same will apply for the new aircraft carriers. Existing core technology 
and consumption levels for SSBNs and aircraft carriers will remain in the 
years to come, however, thus requiring at least one refueling during their 
operational life.115 
By assuming a lifetime for the submarines of 30 years and a lifetime of 
45 years for the aircraft carriers, and assuming compliance with the START 
treaties, we can derive the expected total number of operating naval reactors. 
Providing that the U.S. Navy’s most extensive plans are initiated – with 30 
new attack submarines – the total number of operating U.S. Naval reactors 
by 2020 will be 86 (14 SSBNs, 49 SSNs and 10 aircraft carriers, 2 submari-
nes for training, research and development, plus the NR-1). The develop-
ment of the nuclear-propelled fleet is presented in Figure A1, with the 
decommissioning of older vessels taken into account.  
                                                     
107  Schwartz et al. (1998), p. 140.  
108  von Hippel et al. (1986), p. 3. 
109  I.e. Eriksen (1990), p. 47. 
110  Schwartz et al. (1998), p. 141, footnote 89. 
111  A specific program is getting started on developing a reactor for the Navy's new class of 
aircraft carriers, called the "CVNX", prolonging their lifetimes. U.S. Secretary of Energy 
Bill Richardson before the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Military 
Procurement U.S. House of Representatives, March 4, 1999.  
http://www.doe.gov/news/testimon/cas3499.htm 
112  Director, Naval Propulsion Program (1995), p. 9. 
113  Sharpe (1999), p. 794. 
114  Director Naval Propulsion Program (1995), p. 9. 
115  The current reactor core design for the aircraft carriers is more than 30 years old. In fact, 
by the time the last Nimitz-class carrier is retired, the design will have been in use for 
nearly 100 years (as the last Nimitz-class carrier is planned to be commissioned Decem-
ber 2002). This technology of the early 1970’s has mechanical features that facilitate 
reactor servicing but make less than fully efficient use of the active core volume. These 
cores, like the ones in USS Enterprise, operate for over 20 years. 
Morten Bremer Maerli 
Nupi june 02 
30 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
N
um
be
r o
f o
pe
ra
tin
g 
re
ac
to
rs
 
2000 2002 2005 2008 2010 2015 2020
Year
SSBN SSN CVN OTHERS
 
Figure A1. U.S. Naval reactors operating until 2020, given the proposed 
production of 30 new SSNs 
 
According to current production schemes, the number of operating naval 
reactors will be reduced to 86 by 2020, as compared to the 103 reactors ope-
rating in 1999.116  
In 1995, with 158 operating U.S. naval reactors, the annual burn-up of U-
235 in the entire fleet was reported to be approximately 1.1 tons.117 Thus, as 
a crude approximation, on average each U.S. reactor used 7 kg of U-235 dur-
ing that year of operation. The annual burn-up 20 years from now will be 
approximately 600 kg of HEU, or slightly more than half of the 1995 burn-
up.118 
Probably more important in the longer term, however, are technical deve-
lopments in the reactor core. The introduction of life-time reactor core tech-
nology will mean new and unparalleled fuel saving benefits. As mentioned, 
U.S. submarines today put to sea equipped with reactors designed to last the 
life of the ship, obviating the need for refueling.119 Thus, even with the most 
                                                     
116  14 SSBNs, 49 SSNs and 10 aircraft carriers, 2 submarines for training, research and 
development, and the NR-1. Based on Sharpe (1999) and FAS (1999) and an average 
lifetime for the submarines of 30 years and a life of 45 years for the aircraft carriers. The 
decommissioning of the USS Enterprise before 2015 comprises a reduction of eight 
reactors alone. 
117  Office of Naval Reactors, quoted in National Academy of Sciences (1995), p. 166. 
118  Attack submarine reactors are operated at more demanding modes, so the SSN-fraction 
of annual consumption is somewhat higher than the overall average indicated. However, 
the annual U-235 consumption of 7 kg is well in accordance with a lifetime core lasting 
30 years with a total of 200 kg U-235 in the core.  
119  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Classification Review (1995), p. 3. 
http://www.osti.gov/html/osti/opennet/document/nnppcr/nnppcr.html  
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extensive U.S. submarine modernization and production plans, with 30 new 
attack submarines within the coming two decades,120 the U.S. Navy will 
need less HEU.  
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Figure A2: Annual integrated HEU fuel consumption ratio relative to 2000 
levels for U.S. attack submarine. The relative decline is mostly due to the 
introduction of new reactor technology. 
 
By 2020, with the successful launching of all the planned new SSNs with 
lifetime cores and the decommissioning of 40 old SSNs (due to expired ser-
vice lifetimes), the annual lifetime integrated naval HEU fuel consumption 
of U-235 for U.S. attack submarines will be 60% of the levels for the year 
2000 (see Figure A2).121 Beyond 2025, including only the new SSNs, the 
lifetime integrated fuel loads of HEU will be 6 tons of U-235, contrasted 
with the 18 tons required to meet the consumption needs if old core techno-
logy were still applied.122 
Russia’s naval program  
Today’s Russian submarines use HEU as well, but with enrichment levels 
ranging from 40 to 90%.123 Russia’s nuclear-propelled icebreaker fleet uses 
fuel with the same enrichment levels, as the reactors in these icebreakers 
were used as test-beds for Russian nuclear submarine reactors. The propor-
                                                     
120  According to commissioning schemes in FAS (1999).  
121  The annual integrated fuel consumption is the expected lifetime consumption of HEU, 
averaged over the operating years. An average lifetime of 30 years for submarines of 30 
years and 45 years for aircraft carriers is assumed. 
122  Assuming, in accordance with Cochran et al., an average of 200 kg of HEU in the reactor 
cores.  
123  Bukharin & Potter (1995). 
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tion of incidents of diversion involving naval HEU in Russia has been not-
ably high.124 Naval fuel seems to have been particularly exposed to theft, 
and the enrichment levels of the fuel involved make such attempts worri-
some.  
In the Murmansk region of Russia alone, six known thefts of naval HEU 
fuel took place between 1993 and 1996.125 Insiders, either military personnel 
or contract workers at the shipyards, were often involved in these inci-
dents.126 In September 1999, thieves disabled a nuclear submarine by pilfer-
ing vital equipment.127 In January 2000, four Russian sailors and a retired 
officer were arrested for stealing a fuel rod from a nuclear powered subma-
rine.128 This misdeed was economically motivated, carried out by key per-
sonnel with detailed knowledge about the security systems and the necessary 
protective measures.  
In terms of submarines and naval reactors produced, the Russian naval 
program outmatches that of the U.S. However, Russia’s submarines are now 
at an all-time low in terms of deployment and readiness, spending significant 
time in port due to the current economic situation in Russia. The severe bud-
get crunch has forced the Russian Navy to retire older attack submarines and 
ballistic missile submarines prematurely, and to concentrate its limited sour-
ces on maintaining only the most modern assets – the Oscar and Akula 
attack submarines and the Delta IV SSBN.129 Less frequent deployment at 
sea helps extend the service lives of existing systems.130  
For nearly three months starting in early May 1998, Russia had no opera-
tional SSBNs at sea.131 Russia does not have the money to maintain and 
repair its six huge Typhoon submarines, so these vessels have not been on 
active duty since 1995. In the Fall of 1999 it was decided to decommission 
the Typhoons before they reached the end of their operational lifetime.132 
However, in early 2000 news reports indicated that three of six Typhoon-
class submarines would remain in active operation to test new strategic mis-
siles.133 
Since 1958, the Soviet Union and Russia have constructed 249 nuclear-
powered submarines, representing more than half of the submarines pro-
                                                     
124  Bukharin & Potter (1995). 
125  See Maerli (1999). 
126  Thefts of military equipment and fuel by servicemen in Russia’s underfunded military 
became frequent in 1990s. DOE officials report that they made progress with the Russian 
Navy in installing security systems after several incidents involving sailors led it to take 
the theft seriously, but the challenges remains, see e.g. GAO (2000). Some of the earlier 
thefts, such as the diversion of 1.8 kg HEU (36%) from a North Fleet storage site in July 
1993 and the theft of 4.5 kg HEU from the Sevmorput shipyard in November the same 
year, led the U.S. to expand its MPC&A program to the naval fuel cycle. Four more inci-
dents involving naval HEU in the same region were reported during the subsequent three 
years. (Lee, 1996)  
127  ABC News, September 9, 2000. “Thieves Cripple Russian Nuclear Sub”. 
128  New York Times, February 1, 2000. “Russian Servicemen Accused of Theft”.  
129  Wilkening (1998), p. 20. 
130  Handler, quoted in Wilkening (1998), p. 20.  
131  IISS (1998), p. 102.  
132  Litovkin. (1999), p.30.  
133  From Kudrik (2000) “Typhoons to remain in service”.  
http://www.bellona.no/imaker?id=14203&sub=1.  This contradicts, however, both the 
plans announced by the American Co-operative Threat Reduction, or CTR, program and 
reports that Bark-class missiles will be discarded due to design failures. 
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duced worldwide.134 Two thirds of these vessels were delivered to the Nor-
thern Fleet, the rest were destined for the Pacific Fleet. In addition to combat 
submarines, five research and development submarines and several full-sized 
land-based submarine-training facilities have been produced. Additionally, 
the eight ships in the Russian icebreaker fleet are nuclear propelled, each 
with one or two reactors and accompanied by four battle cruisers and a com-
munication ship with twin reactors. Most Russian submarines are equipped 
with two reactors. The overall number of naval reactors produced by the 
Soviet Union/Russia is therefore at least 480.The vessels use fuel enriched 
from below 21% to 90%.135 Of these, a total of 24 reactors are believed to 
have been designed to use uranium enriched to 90% U-235.136 
Deployment peaked in 1989, when approximately 196 submarines were 
in service.137 Most of the submarines have now reached the end of their ser-
vice lives and have been decommissioned. These vessels await dismantle-
ment, a process involving huge safety (environmental) and security challen-
ges.138 As of early 1999, the Russian force was composed of 26 SSBNs (and 
SSGNs) and 22 SSNs.139 
Future Russian naval reactors and fuel consumption levels 
The current socio-economic situation in Russia renders the size of the future 
Russian submarine forces extremely uncertain. A minimum force will prob-
ably remain, especially as the strategic role of Russian submarines is likely 
to increase. If the START II treaty is ever implemented, over half of the 
remaining Russian warheads will be based on SSBNs.140  
Russia is therefore likely to maintain a limited number of modern subma-
rines (SSBNs) in the coming decade, eventually replacing the last Delta IIIs, 
built in the mid- to late-1970s, with the new Borey class.141 The Delta III is 
the only SSBN currently deployed with the Pacific Fleet. If not enough 
Borey-class submarines are deployed to maintain the number of vessels in 
both the Northern and the Pacific Fleets, the Russian Navy will have to con-
solidate its SSBN operations with the Northern Fleet.142 
According to Russian naval officers, by 2005 or 2006 Russia will retain 
only 10–12 submarines as nuclear weapon platforms.143 These figures are 
supported by members of the Russian Duma who have claimed that the 
Navy will need 65 to 72 submarines in the 21st century, including 12 to 13 
SSBNs, the same number of SSNs to protect these SSBNs, and 10 to 12 
                                                     
134  92 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 67 cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), 90 
attack submarines (SSNs).  
135  Bukharin & Potter (1995), p. 48.  
136  Bukharin (1996), p. 63. 
137  Bukharin & Handler (1995), p. 246. Based on Sharpe (1990), p. 557, it can be assumed 
that approximately 120 of the vessels were SSBNs or SSGns. .  
138  For a description of the challenges in decommissioning the Russian submarine fleet, see 
e.g. Bukharin & Handler (1995) and Moltz & Robinson (1999).  
139  Sharpe (1999).  
140  U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (1997), p. 11.  
141  Arkin & Kristensen (1998) 
142  Wilkening (1998), p. 22.  
143  Ovcharenko (1998) 
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SSNs each in the Northern and Pacific Fleets to engage in tactical operations 
and monitor enemy SSBNs.144  
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Figure A3. Operating Russian ballistic missile submarines 1989 to 2010. 
Predicted figures are maximum numbers, depending both on the finalization 
of projected submarines and on prolonged lifetimes of existing SSBNs.  
 
This figure seems, however, to depend on the production of several new 
ships. Even if 10 Boreys are produced, the Russian SSBN force could shrink 
to as few as 4 to 12 ships.145 The current production plans and actual pro-
gress do not support an extensive Russian submarine manufacture. The keel 
of the fourth-generation strategic missile Yuriy Dolgorukiy of the Borey 
class was laid down in November 1996. However, work on the vessel, the 
only nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine under construction, has 
been halted pending a redesign of the missile system.146 The submarine was 
scheduled for launch in 2002, but is now planned to enter service in 2010. 
Thus, Russia’s existing strategic submarines may have to enter more 
demanding operating schedules, and decreased service lives might result.147  
 The keel of the first of the fourth-generation attack submarines, the 
Severodvinsk class, was laid down in late 1993. However, work on the sub-
                                                     
144  Stated by Duma member Kuznetsov, May 1998, in an article in Nezavisimoye voyennoye 
obozreniye, translated in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies database. According to 
Kuznetsov, the absence of clear enemies necessitates an “economic” approach to esti-
mating Russia’s naval force requirements in the 21st century, in which the “naval order 
of battle is determined by capacities for regular funding in the form of a certain propor-
tion of GNP”. This may explain the discrepancies between the desired numbers of sub-
marines, i.e. 65 to 72, and the actual numbers indicated (adding up to a total of maximum 
48 submarines).  
145  Arkin & Kristensen (1998)  
146  Admiral Kuroyedov, quoted in Baker (1999).  
147  This has been claimed by  Litovkin (1999), p.30. 
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marine has been suspended since 1996. Currently progress is slow to the 
point where the program is in doubt.148 Unless shipyard workers are paid 
regularly and equipment manufactures supported by industry, these sub-
marines will take a very long time to complete. Between 1999 and 2005 
three attack submarines are scheduled for launch – but also here, implemen-
tation of these plans remains uncertain.  
Despite the economic problems, the Russian icebreaker fleet is likely to 
continue operating in the coming decades. Given an estimated lifetime of 35 
years,149 six of the eight icebreakers will keep going until 2010 and three, or 
possibly four, will operate until 2025. The construction of a new icebreaker, 
“50 Let Pobedy”, formerly called “Ural”, was begun back in 1989, sche-
duled to enter service in 1994. Scarce funding and a reduction of cargo ship-
ments in the Arctic regions have caused contract delays. However, starting in 
2000, limited annual funding for the completion of the icebreaker has been 
made available.150 
Moreover, given the success of the Russian naval nuclear propulsion pro-
gram, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has proposed extending the 
uses of these reactors to provide electricity and heat to remote communi-
ties.151 This would involve placing the reactors on floating barges to be tran-
sported to coastal areas or possibly underground, e.g. in mines, to make 
extensive sources of energy available locally. These plans have yet to be 
implemented, and again, the economic situation makes the future deploy-
ment of naval reactors as miniature power plants uncertain. However, given 
Russia’s persistent energy needs, particularly in the Far North and Far East, 
the push for the use of non-propulsion, naval power reactors is likely to 
increase in the coming years. Russian officials claim that the International 
Atomic Energy Agency has approved the initial designs for these reactors.152 
Very limited information is released on the Russian reactor cores, ura-
nium enrichment level, and core lifetimes. Generally, higher enrichment lev-
els will allow longer operating times, and a critical design objective is refuel-
ling periods of up to nine to ten years. However, with lower enrichment lev-
els, core lives of approximately seven years are more probable, depending on 
operating modes.153 Various different fuel geometries and shapes have been 
applied for former Soviet, now Russian, nuclear submarine reactor produc-
tion. The Soviet Union developed four generations of naval pressurized reac-
tors, each generation with improved reliability, compactness, and silence of 
operation. However, there are no reports to indicate substantially prolonged 
core lives even in the latest generation of submarines. The third-generation 
                                                     
148  Sharpe (1999), p 560. 
149  The economic situation may, somewhat paradoxically, extend the service lives of the 
ships due to limited operational schedules and no possibilities for replacing ships. 
Service lives even above 35 years could thus be the result.  
150  In 2000, the Russian government pledged to earmark around USD 3.5 million, but 
according to the shipyard, some 25 million dollars annually is required to finalize the 
ship in three years. From Kudrik (2000) “New icebreaker might enter service in three 
years”. http://www.bellona.no/imaker?id=15129&sub=1 
151  From the database of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute 
for International Studies.  
152  Thein (1997), quoted in the CNS database.  
153  According to Bukharin & Potter (1995), p. 47, most Russian submarines have two pres-
surized-water reactors which, under normal operating conditions, require refueling every 
7 to 10 years. 
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reactors (OK-650) began entering into service in 1987.154 None of the 
fourth-generation submarines have so far been put to sea.  
First- and second-generation submarines generally have U-235 enrich-
ment levels below 21%, while specific classes (e.g. November and Alfa) 
reportedly have 90% enrichment levels.155 The third generation is probably 
enriched in a range of 21% to 45%.156 Such enrichment levels correspond 
well to the operational periods of these submarines, with refueling occurring 
approximately every seven years. In the past, the Russian Navy and the ice-
breaker fleet each required five to ten fresh cores annually.157 In recent years 
however, the naval fuel requirement has dropped to a few cores per year, as 
the Murmansk Shipping Company (the operator of the icebreaker fleet) and 
the Russian Navy each conducts one to two refuelings a year.158 
Russia’s icebreakers and submarines use the same reactor concepts; these 
icebreakers have been used as test beds for the development of submarine 
reactors. As the icebreaker reactor core is much more accessible than a sub-
marine core, it is easier to cope with the problems of potential fuel element 
rupture.159 Moreover, defuelling or refuelling an icebreaker does not involve 
the lengthy processes of opening and sealing the hull, as with submarines. 
Current icebreakers use enrichment levels ranging from 20 to 90%.160 Non-
homogeneous enrichment levels within each of the cores are possible, for 
example with a HEU enrichment gradient of 20% from the core perimeter to 
the center of the reactor core.161 
Little information is available on the sources, uses and inventories of 
Russian HEU. Estimates indicate a total Soviet/Russian production of 1,400 
tons of weapons-grade HEU from 1950 through 1988, after the production of 
HEU for defense purposes stopped.162 The inventory of remaining military 
HEU stocks in Russia was estimated to 1,010 tons at the end of 1997,163 
including the 500 tons of HEU slated for sale to the United States under the 
U.S.–Russian HEU deal. This HEU inventory estimate does not, however, 
include any HEU dedicated to the naval fuel cycle. According to calculations 
made by Oleg Bukharin, the average amount of U-235 in Russian ship reac-
tor cores is approximately 100 kg.164 With an estimated need for three 
(re)fuelling sessions per reactor, overall U-235 consumption for all the 478 
naval reactor cores produced is thus roughly 143 tons.  
By assuming an average enrichment level of 30% and 315 kg of uranium 
on average in the reactor cores,165 we can perform simple calculations of the 
                                                     
154  Bukharin & Handler (1995), p. 249. 
155  Bukharin & Potter (1995), p. 48.  
156  Idem. 
157  Bukharin (1998), p. 319.  
158  Reportedly, the Murmansk Shipping Company has become the principal customer of the 
Electrostal naval fuel production line. From Bukharin (1998). This is another indication 
of the financial hardships faced by the Russian Navy.  
159  Eriksen (1990), p.49. 
160  Maerli et al. (1998), p. 262.  
161  Volkov (1997), personal communication.  
162  DOE/EIA (1998).  
163  Weapons-grade equivalent HEU. From Albright, in Albright & O’Neill (eds.) (1999), p. 
11. According to Bunn (2000), p. 18, the stockpile is 1050 tons of HEU, or 40 tons more 
than the estimates given by Albright. As Bunn points out, there are substantial uncertain-
ties associated with the numbers presented. The latter quantity is over 100 tons less than 
the official estimate of the DOE MPC&A Strategic Plan.  
164  Bukharin (1996), p. 63 
165  Based on Bukharin (1996), p. 63.  
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fuel savings in the period 1999 to 2005. As seen, the number of strategic 
submarines will decrease from 26 to approximately 12. Due to the very lim-
ited construction of new submarines, the number of SSNs is, as a conserva-
tive approximation, assumed to remain constant. Normally, each submarine 
uses three batches of uranium fuel, or approximately 950 kg. Thus, due to 
reduction in the strategic submarine fleet, the impact on naval fuel consump-
tion constitutes a reduction of approximately 13.3 tons of intermediately 
enriched uranium (30%), or nearly 4 tons of U-235 – corresponding to a 
reduction in the annual U-235 consumption of approximately 800 kg over 
the next five years.  

Appendix II:  
U.S. and Russian Naval Fuel – 
Proliferation Potential  
In this appendix the proliferation attractiveness of highly enriched naval fuel 
is assessed. This is partly done by looking at the enrichment levels of the 
fuel and partly by assessing the challenges associated with using the fuel in 
crude nuclear devices. The assessments performed are crude first-order 
approximations and should be regarded preliminary.  
With the end of the Cold War, the vast quantities of nuclear weapon-
usable material have emerged as one of the most important threats to inter-
national security. At the center of technical proliferation concerns is the 
direct-use material that can be employed to make nuclear weapons without 
further enrichment or reprocessing.166 Plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) are the key ingredients of nuclear weapons. The manage-
ment and control of this material is essential for reducing the potential for 
nuclear proliferation, nuclear war, and nuclear terrorism. Unlike plutonium, 
most of the world’s HEU is in military stocks. In addition to its use in 
nuclear weapons, it is employed to fuel research reactors, reactors that pro-
duce tritium, and to produce the fuel that powers nuclear submarines.167  
It is considerably easier to make a bomb using enriched uranium than 
using plutonium.168 With uranium there is essentially no risk of premature 
detonation due to neutrons from spontaneous fission, as the spontaneous fis-
sion rates are far lower than for plutonium. Moreover, as fresh HEU is much 
less radioactive than weapons-grade plutonium, the material can be handled 
with limited risk, even without protective measures or shielding. This means 
that HEU bomb assemblies will be practical, more readily brought together – 
and more likely to function without prior testing. All these factors make 
HEU a more attractive material than plutonium for potential proliferators, 
particularly those with limited access to sophisticated technology.  
The ease or difficulty of acquiring sufficient quantities of fissile material 
is a major factor in the production of nuclear weapons. All stocks with wea-
pons-usable material are attractive targets. This appendix investigates the 
proliferation potential of HEU – more specifically, the proliferation attrac-
tiveness of fresh HEU for naval propulsion and the possible production of 
crude nuclear weapons based on this material. The final section of this 
                                                     
166  In accordance with internationally accepted standards regarding special fissionable and 
weapons-usable (“direct-use”) material, and as reflected in IAEA definitions and practi-
ces, the material are plutonium 239, highly enriched uranium (i.e. uranium containing 
more than 20% uranium 235), uranium 233, and material containing any of the forego-
ing. 
167  Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen used to enhance the explosive yield of every 
thermonuclear weapon. It is normally produced by bombarding lithium with neutrons 
(e.g. from a U-235 chain reaction in a reactor). 
168  Bodansky, p. 271. 
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appendix presents a general discussion of the production of crude nuclear 
weapons. For the purpose of this report, a “crude” design means either of the 
designs successfully demonstrated in 1945, i.e. the gun-type and the implo-
sion-type weapon.169 
Proliferation potential of HEU  
Shortly after the discovery of nuclear fission in 1939 came the realization 
that it might be possible to make a powerful nuclear explosive by extracting 
and concentrating the U-235 from natural uranium. Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU) is a special mixture of isotopes of uranium produced by 
increasing (enriching) the uranium-235 content of natural uranium. An inter-
nationally accepted distinction between “low” and “high” enrichment has 
been made at 20% enrichment. This is based on the understanding that it is 
difficult to fashion an explosive nuclear device from uranium enriched to 
levels of 20% U-235 or less.170 
The proliferation potential of a fuel cycle, or its proliferation resistance, 
is determined by the quantity and the quality of the fissile material that could 
be diverted to military – possibly terrorist – uses. According to Galperin et 
al. (1999) a decisive barrier to proliferation should be based on inherent pro-
perties of the fuel cycle itself in addition to a system of international safe-
guards measures. The attractiveness of the material, or the weapon quality of 
the fissile material, can be evaluated by considering the following properties:  
 
– critical mass 
– radioactivity levels and the weapon stability degradation by heat emission  
– weapon-yield degradation due to pre-initiation caused by spontaneous fis-
sion neutrons. 
 
For uranium, both the radiation levels (and thus heat degradation) and the 
spontaneous fission rate will be very low. Due to the higher rate of spontane-
ous fissions and stray (background) neutrons, all plutonium-weapons will be 
more vulnerable to pre-ignition than weapons based on uranium, a material 
with a lower neutron background.171 Particularly with reactor-grade Pluton-
ium, the probability of “pre-detonation” is very high, raising the probability 
that the weapon will blow itself apart at an early stage and thus cut short the 
chain reaction that releases the energy.172 The reminder of this section will 
                                                     
169  In the gun-type, a subcritical piece of fissile material is fired rapidly into another subcri-
tical piece (the target) such that the final assembly is supercritical without changing the 
density of the material. In the implosion-type, a near critical piece of fissile material is 
compressed by a converging shockwave resulting from the detonation of a surrounding 
layer of high explosive and becomes supercritical because of its increase in density. 
From Mark et al. (1987)  
170  Director, Naval Propulsion Program (1995), p. 35, see also figure A4. 
171  Plutonium releases a steady stream of neutrons from spontaneous decay of its nuclei, 
thus producing a relatively high level of background neutrons. If plutonium is used in a 
gun-type bomb, these neutrons are almost certain to initiate an early chain reaction, caus-
ing a “fizzle” that will destroy the weapon without producing a large nuclear yield. Thus, 
a quick compression of the fissile material is required, leaving out plutonium as the core 
material of gun-type devices that represents a “slower” compression rate. 
172  In weapons using plutonium oxide, normally requiring larger quantities of fissile mater-
ial than metal-based weapons, the device may constitute a powerful radiological dis-
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focus on the critical mass needed for a crude uranium weapon and the yield 
likely to be produced.  
Critical mass 
During the fission of fissionable nuclides, vast amounts of energy are 
released together with neutrons and fission products. The neutrons released 
may induce new fissions in other nuclides. A nuclear chain reaction can 
sustain itself only if there is an assembly of fissile material large and dense 
enough to keep many of the neutrons from escaping. An assembly in which, 
on average, each fission makes one other nucleus spilt, sustaining the reac-
tion at a steady state, is called “critical”.  
A subcritical assembly would not maintain the chain reaction, and it 
would die down. By contrast, a supercritical (bomb) assembly causes the 
reaction to grow exponentially, releasing large amounts of energy before the 
weapon finally destroys itself. Weapons manufacturers thus need something 
like a critical mass of the material they intend to use, preferably of metal, 
although oxide powder might be used.  
The critical mass varies for different isotopic compositions. For a particu-
lar fissile material, the amount that constitutes a critical mass can further 
vary widely depending on the enrichment level, the density, and the nature 
and fractional quantity of any inert diluents present (such as oxygen in uran-
ium oxide, uranium-238 in partially enriched uranium-235, or chemical 
impurities).173 Further, the critical mass is highly dependent upon the pre-
sence of reflectors surrounding the core to return to the system the neutrons 
that would otherwise have been lost.  
For higher densities of the material, the critical mass decreases signify-
cantly. The bare critical masses (without any reflectors) are 52 kg of 94% U-
235 metal (density 18.7 g/cc) and approximately 110 kg of uranium-oxide 
enriched to 94% U-235 (density 11.4 g/cc).174 Due to the greater cross sec-
tion of plutonium weapons isotopes, the bare critical mass of 239-plutonium 
metal with a density of 19.9 g/cc is as low as 10 kg.175 
Uranium bombs can be made with a wide range of uranium enrichments, 
but the mass required is greater for lower enrichments. For lower enrichment 
levels, e.g. 50% enriched metal uranium, the bare critical mass is approxi-
mately 160 kg – a threefold increase compared to the 94% enrichment level, 
given the material of the same density. Not only is very highly enriched 
uranium preferable for building a compact bomb, less separative work is 
required to obtain a smaller critical mass (roughly 18 kg) at 90% enrichment 
than to obtain a larger critical mass (37 kg) at 60% enrichment.176 This is 
                                                     
persion device (because of the scattering of the oxide, due to the chemical explosion) 
even if the nuclear chain reaction is aborted and the weapon fizzles. 
173  Mark et al. (1987), p. 56. 
174  Ibid, p. 57. 
175  Cross section is a measure of the probability that an incident neutron will interact with a 
particular nuclide. Cross sections are separately specified for different target nuclides 
and different reactions. The cross section has units of area and can be, loosely, thought of 
as an effective target for a specific process. Bondansky (1996), p. 374.  
176  At 60% enrichment, the separative work is 125 SWU/kg, or 4600 SWU for 37 kg 
(assuming natural uranium feed). This may be compared to 193 SWU/kg and about 3500 
SWU total for 17 kg of 90% enriched uranium. From Bodansky (1996), p.271. 
Morten Bremer Maerli 
Nupi june 02 
42 
why high enrichments (and less fissile material) are normally used in uran-
ium bombs. 
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Figure A4. Critical mass of uranium metal in the form of spheres enclosed in 
thick neutron reflectors of natural uranium, as function of enrichment lev-
els.177 
 
The relationship between enrichment levels and critical masses for an 
assembly with a neutron reflector is illustrated in Figure A4. With a good 
reflector, the critical mass for 60% enrichment is 22 kg of U-235 and 37 kg 
of uranium, while only 15 kg of U-235 is required at 100% enrichment lev-
els (pure U-235).178 Thus, reflectors may reduce the critical mass by as much 
as a factor of three. As shown in the Figure, material enriched to less than 
15–20% U-235 cannot be used in a nuclear weapon, because sufficiently 
rapid supercritical assembly becomes impractical.179  
The simplest type of nuclear explosive, a “gun type”, in which the opti-
mum critical configuration is assembled more slowly than in an “implosion 
type” device, cannot be made with plutonium. The Pu-240 content even in 
weapons-grade plutonium is so large that very rapid assembly is necessary to 
prevent pre-initiation.180 Gun-type weapons can thus be made only with 
                                                     
177  From Moniz & Neff (1978), p. 44. 
178  Bodansky (1996), p.271 
179  Moniz. & Neff (1978), p. 42. According to Chow & Solomon (1993), p. 5, the critical 
mass of HEU enriched to 20% will be 250 kg. Adding the other necessary components of 
a primitive nuclear weapon (reflector and high explosives) would make a bomb using 
uranium with less than 20% fissile content very heavy, and it would be impractical to 
develop a survivable delivery system for it. The bare critical mass of HEU enriched to 
20% will be as high as 800 kg. Mark et al. (1987). 
180  This is due to the neutron background from spontaneous fissions.  
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highly enriched uranium, in which spontaneous fission is rare. Either mater-
ial can, however, be used in an implosion device. 
Rather than the gun-type assembly, the first Chinese bomb used an 
implosion design to assemble the critical mass of uranium, necessitating con-
siderably less material to make a weapon. By comparing the 6 kg fissioned 
in the Nagasaki bomb with the critical mass of 10 kg for naked plutonium 
not surrounded by a neutron reflector, Garwin and Charpak (1999) predict 
that it is possible to manufacture an implosion bomb with 34 kg of uranium 
or less.181 According to Mark et al. (1987), 25 kg of very highly enriched 
uranium would be needed for an implosion-type HEU weapon.182 
The minimum quantities of approximately 25 kg indicated are well in 
accordance with the Significant Quantities used by the IAEA.183 However, 
these significant quantities have been criticized for being too large, as 
nuclear fission weapons could reportedly be produced with as low as 2.5 kg 
to 8 kg of HEU, depending on the sophistication of the weapon design.184 
Weapon yield 
The energy yield of nuclear weapons is commonly expressed in kilotons (kt) 
or megatons (Mt) of TNT equivalent. Yield will depend on the quantity of 
fissile material available, and, more importantly, on the ability of the nuclear 
device to maintain a supercritical configuration. The energy output can be 
devastating even in crude nuclear weapons: the weapons dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki produced yields more than 1000 times the biggest 
conventional bomb ever deployed in warfare.185  
Even if pre-ignition in a simple nuclear device similar to the Nagasaki 
bomb occurs at the worst possible moment, when the material first become 
compressed enough to sustain a chain reaction, the explosive yield will be in 
the order of one or a few kilotons.186 While this is referred to as a “fizzle 
yield”, a 1-kiloton bomb would still have a radius of destruction of roughly 
one-third that of the Hiroshima weapon, making it a potentially fearsome 
explosive. 
The complete fission of U-235 in a reactor releases 8.2 x 1013 J/kg.187 
About 85% of the energy comes from the fission fragments themselves and 
5% from prompt neutron and gamma rays. The complete fission of 1 kg of 
U-235 would give a prompt explosive yield of about 7 x 1013 J/kg, or 
approximately 17 kt. The actual yield of nuclear weapons is less than 17 
                                                     
181  Based on the assumption that the mechanical properties of the material are similar and on 
a critical mass of 56 kg for naked uranium (enriched to 93.5% in U-235). Garwin & 
Charpak (1999), p. I-283.  
182  Mark et al. (1987). 
183  A significant quantity (SQ) is defined by the IAEA as “the approximate quantity of 
nuclear material in respect of which, taking into account any conversion process invol-
ved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.” 
For plutonium the significant quantity is taken to be 8 kg; for highly enriched uranium 
(HEU), 25 kg of contained U-235; for low-enriched uranium (LEU), 75 kg of contained 
U-235. 
184  Cochran & Paine (1995). With good designs and high-speed explosives, pure nuclear fis-
sion weapons could be manufactured with limited amounts of plutonium or HEU.  
185  Named the “Earthquake bomb” and the “Grand Slam”, with a conventional yield of 10 
tons of TNT.  
186  National Academy of Sciences (1994), p.33. 
187  Bodansky (1996), p. 261. 
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kt/kg, because a bomb will disassemble without complete fissioning of all 
the material. More poorly assembled nuclear devices will produce a smaller 
yield, because the chain reaction will be aborted as the system rapidly 
expands. Nevertheless, they may produce a significant radiation burst.  
The early plutonium bombs had efficiency under 20%, and this figure 
probably is even lower for crude uranium bombs. The bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima had a yield of approximately 15 kt, but only some 700 g of the 
total of 60 kg of uranium actually fissioned, indicating an efficiency of a 
little more than 1%. A complete fissioning of 6 kg of HEU will produce 
slightly above 100 kt, so 1% efficiency would give a yield of approximately 
1 kt. This makes feasible the estimates of Cochran and Paine (1995), indicat-
ing that 8 kg of HEU, or as low as 2.5 kg for more sophisticated weapons, is 
sufficient to produce a yield of 1 kiloton.  
Part of the energy from the explosives compressing the fissile material 
will heat the device and the surroundings. The yields produced will depend 
on how close to the fissile material is to the critical mass prior to the com-
pression, especially for the less compressible oxide material. This means that 
the willingness of perpetrators to risk potential criticality incidents while 
preparing the device will be an important factor in determining the yield pro-
duced.  
Crude nuclear weapon production 
Expert opinion differs on the ease of building a clandestine nuclear explosive 
outside the purview of a traditional state weapons program. The following 
discussion will argue that such production is feasible. Due to the anticipated 
limited technical skills of potential would-be-nuclear-terrorists, only crude 
nuclear weapon designs will be investigated here. 
The primary restraining factor in the production of clandestine nuclear 
weapons is likely to be the difficulty of access to highly enriched uranium or 
plutonium, the essential ingredients of such weapons. The vast quantities of 
fissile material produced during the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet 
Union may increase the availability of the weapons-usable material. Thus, 
while the primary barrier may be crumbling, the importance of other barriers 
against clandestine production and deployment may increase.  
The fact that the most substantial problem of a potential bomb-maker is 
to acquire sufficient amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material has been 
underlined by John Foster, former director of the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory: 
  
the only difficult part of making a fission bomb of some sort is the prepa-
ration of a supply of fissionable material of adequate purity: the design of 
the bomb it self is relatively easy….188 
 
Luis W. Alvarez, a prominent nuclear weapon scientist in the Manhattan 
Project, has emphasized the simplicity of constructing a nuclear explosive 
with highly enriched uranium: 189 
                                                     
188  s cited in Abrams & Pollak (1994), p.1.  
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With modern weapons-grade uranium, the background neutron rate is so 
low that terrorists, if they have such material, would have a good chance 
of setting of a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the 
material onto the other half. Most people seem unaware that if separated 
HEU is at hand it’s a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion... even a 
high school kid could make a bomb in short order. 
 
While Alvarez does not specify the meaning of “high-yield” explosion, it is 
probable that a yield in the kiloton range could be established. Thus, the dif-
ficulty of designing and fabricating a nuclear weapon from either highly 
enriched uranium or plutonium may often seem exaggerated. A competent 
group of nuclear physicists and electronic and explosive engineers would 
have little difficulty in designing and constructing such a weapon from 
scratch. Moreover, they would not need access to any classified informa-
tion.190  
The nuclear weapons developed in the mid 1940s then represented the 
“state of the art” in technical engineering and nature science. Today these 
weapons are regarded as both primitive and outdated. Though no detailed 
descriptions of nuclear weapons have been released publicly, the principles 
behind the first fission explosions are widely known and available from the 
scientific literature and from declassified U.S. documents. Also in the swarm 
of information on the Internet, description and background information on 
crude nuclear weapon production can be found.191  
The simplicity of the gun-type design makes it probable that a workable 
uranium bomb could be produced without any testing. “Little Boy”, the HEU 
bomb dropped on Hiroshima, was triggered by a simple “gun” mechanism. 
A small, slug-shaped piece of uranium was fired down a barrel into a larger, 
cup-shaped piece of HEU, and the weapon was used without previous test-
ing.192 And yet this elementary design generated a destructive force of about 
15 kilotons — the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT.  
In 1993 South Africa surprised the world by announcing that the 
country’s clandestine production of nuclear weapons had ceased, that the 
weapons had been dismantled and that the country was ready to submit all 
former weapons activities to the control of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. Despite the international embargo posed on the apartheid regime, 
six nuclear weapons had been produced during a period of four years. These 
weapons, all developed without any testing, were of the gun-type design. On 
average each weapon contained about 55 kg of uranium enriched to 94% U-
235.193 
The fact that terrorists may not have to heed many of the restrictions and 
problems of states’ nuclear weapon programs may further increase the risk 
of the sub-national production of clandestine nuclear weapons. First, the 
                                                     
189  Alvarez (1987), p. 125. Although the initial chain reaction would not be sustained and 
the device would fizzle due to the physical expansion of the fissile material, significant 
energy could be released. 
190  Barnaby (1993), p. 37.  
191  Maerli (1999) p. 87.  
192  “Fat Man”, the plutonium bomb deployed over Nagasaki, had the same design as the 
bomb used in the Trinity test, the first deployment of a nuclear weapon, performed July 
6, 1945 in New Mexico.  
193  Cochran (1993) 
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requirement of knowing the precise yields of the weapons will be superflu-
ous for terrorists. While covert attackers would want predictable weapons-
effects, less precision is required than for state military purposes.194 Further, 
terrorists will not have to meet the extremely stringent specifications and 
tolerance required for military weapons production.195 State military wea-
pons must, to a much larger extent than terrorist weapons, be reliable, safe 
and optimal. That is, when the weapons are used, they must function with 
optimal yields with the minimal impact of possible effects of aging or other 
deteriorating factors, e.g. heat deterioration. Moreover, during long-term 
storage, state weapons must remain safe and secure, to guard against unin-
tentional or unauthorized detonation.  
Weapons for military uses are needed in large numbers, and they must be 
delivered by conventional military means (missiles, mortars etc.). Due to 
their limited size and weight, crude nuclear weapons will easily fit into a 
van, or even automobiles, for subsequent detonation in densely populated 
areas. Other non-military means of delivery could be trucks or ships in har-
bors. Crude nuclear weapons will be produced in limited numbers, reducing 
the costs of manufacture and maintenance. Finally, while state nuclear wea-
pon programs are usually supported by a large infrastructure and perhaps 
reprocessing facilities for the separation of fissile weapons material, sub-
national groups will normally rely on smaller programs and most probably 
externally acquired weapons-usable material.196 It is also possible that 
“rogue” governments unwilling to use weapons of mass destruction due to 
fear of retaliation could readily supply the raw material or the finished pro-
duct to terrorists – whether by political design or for commercial gain.197  
 
                                                     
194  Falkenrath et al. (1998), p. 100.  
195  Mark et al. (1987) p. 63.  
196  The Aum Shinrikyo cult is an exception. The cult unsuccessfully tried to develop HEU 
from natural uranium mined at the cult’s premises in Australia.  
197  Laqueur (1999), p. 5. 
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Summary 
Due to high enrichment levels, naval uranium fuel may serve as a backdoor 
for production of clandestine nuclear weapons. Yet, no bi- or multilateral 
verification is envisioned on these sensitive fuel cycles. The naval nuclear 
fuel cycles remain hidden in secrecy. Both the shape and the composition of 
the highly enriched uranium fuel are strictly classified, as are current and 
estimated consumption rates and future needs. 
Any transparency measures on these fuel cycles could introduce the risk 
that classified, sensitive or proprietary information might be compromised or 
released – with adverse impacts on national security and international obli-
gations. Apart from the proliferation risks, this may increase vulnerability 
and lessen the (political) strength of the nation, as sensitive technical infor-
mation and weaknesses could be revealed. Moreover, increased openness 
could make it easier for criminals and sub-national groups to divert fissile 
material unlawfully, if government details of the physical protection systems 
and quantities and qualities of fissile material at facilities were to be made 
available.  
The need to protect classified and sensitive information therefore renders 
measurements directly on the fresh fuel highly unlikely. However, as the 
international community stands ready to address the excessive stockpiles of 
weapons-grade fissile material in a substantive and verifiable manner, it will, 
sooner or later, encounter the highly enriched uranium naval stockpiles. 
Eventually, even this material will somehow have to be accounted for and 
some assurances given that it is not being diverted to weapons. Moreover, 
this will not only be needed to secure its proper accountability, control, and 
protection. Controlling the production of all types of weapons-useable mat-
erials, including naval fuel, is most likely a highly important foundation for 
the establishing of a future fissile material cut-off treaty.  
At the same time, there could be important synergetic effects by looking 
simultaneously at different transparency regimes. To support international 
and bilateral nuclear arms-control efforts, technical communities are now 
examining a variety of non-intrusive measurements on items with sensitive 
or classified properties. Many of the challenges, approaches and solutions 
may be similar, and consistent technical information could be provided to 
negotiators while recognizing unique aspects of each regime. Naval fuel 
transparency may thus provide an important feedback opportunity to facili-
tate future nuclear weapons dismantling verification activities.   
To increase confidence in non-diversion of naval fuel and to support con-
temporary nuclear arms control efforts, this report suggests a set of transpar-
ency measures that could be introduced on stockpiles of naval fissile 
material in a non-intrusive manner. Particular attention will be given to U.S. 
and Russian naval fuel stocks, as these are by far the most extensive in the 
world. The report identifies ways to increase transparency in the naval fuel 
cycle without conflicting with national security needs or concerns, and 
argues that such transparency measures will give long-term nuclear security 
benefits. The assessment underlines the need for increased international 
focus on all HEU naval fuel cycles, with a future international naval fuel 
transparency norm as the ultimate goal.  
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Generally, transparency is more than a description of a nuclear program 
or a specific site. Based on voluntary measures, it permits the accumulation 
of data, both direct and indirect, over an extensive period of time to build 
confidence that the behavior of a country or a group of countries is consi-
stent with agreements and norms. Transparency surpasses such required 
activities as reporting to regulatory bodies. Transparency has been aptly 
described as “permitted knowledge”. The voluntary release of information is 
the true measure of transparency. Moreover, while transparency has it 
obvious limitations, taking extra steps of openness beyond expectations will 
promote even higher levels of trust. 
Continued lack of transparency on the naval fuel cycles is likely to be 
detrimental to long-term nuclear security of both nuclear weapon states and 
non-nuclear weapon states. The persistent interest in naval nuclear propul-
sion around the world, possible exports of Russian naval reactor technology, 
and the persistent naval nuclear loophole in existing safeguards agreements 
could all create new HEU markets beyond international control. The need 
for an international transparency norm to increase confidence in non-diver-
sion of highly enriched naval fuel to clandestine nuclear weapon production 
may therefore be stronger than anticipated.  
Technical transparency solutions that might be applied on the naval fuel 
cycle are evolving in related nuclear arms-control arenas. The underlying 
physics is well understood, but the need to protect and limit the data output 
while providing enough information to provide sufficient confidence in the 
results of the measurements raises technical challenges. Thus, a step-wise 
approach, allowing to increase the confidence of the international commun-
ity and potential opponents in non-diversion of the highly proliferation 
attractive naval fuel to clandestine weapon production, should be considered. 
In particular, such a transparency regime could consist of a combination of 
voluntary declarations of quantities and qualities of material destined for 
naval consumption, and, desirably, non-intrusive spot-checks on strategic 
points along the fuel cycle. 
An analysis of existing naval fuel stockpiles and probable future fuel con-
sumption needs shows that the future needs are diminishing. This could ease 
the political process of introducing transparency, even on these highly sensi-
tive naval fuel cycles. Besides, a valuable foundation for non-intrusive trans-
parency on the Russian naval fuel cycle has been created by the highly suc-
cessful cooperative naval fuel security upgrades, due to the close working 
relations established and the ongoing consolidation of fuel to a limited num-
ber of storages. To support these transparency efforts, the U.S. could con-
sider allowing surplus naval fuel to be included in the national declarations 
of excess nuclear material. Additionally, it could abandon its current option 
of allowing nuclear materials to be withdrawn from international safeguards 
for the use as naval fuel.  
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